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Abstract 
 
After the end of the devastating protracted civil war, Sri Lanka is undergoing through a 
comprehensive post war preventive peace building process. These post war efforts in the country 
reveal a unique approach of contemporary conflict prevention enterprise in the context of the 
way the government conducts its post war activities. The emergence of the victors‟ peace 
situation poses question towards the conflict prevention paradigm, which does not give any clear 
guidance to prevent relapse and establish sustainable and positive peace in such a context where 
the victors lacks a political will to address the root causes of conflict through political reform and 
to use the conflict prevention process as a medium of building trust. 
 
The purpose of the research is to see how conflict prevention has been carried out in post war Sri 
Lanka and examine whether it is effective to establish sustainable peace and prevent relapse of 
conflict or not. The research is based on the case study of the various conflict prevention efforts 
taken by different actors. The study is conducted as a comparative study of theory and case to 
simplify the research and draw conclusions which can question or support some of the existing 
practical efforts in Sri Lanka in particular and theoretical approach in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
As a methodology the research applies the theoretical framework of conflict prevention which 
covers not only conflict resolution but also prevent the relapse of conflict. 
 
The research is designed to address the question of conflict prevention in Sri Lanka as well as to 
reveal the deficiencies of the theory in resolving this type of post war situation. 
 
The research proves that the existing theory does not give much guidance to post war situation of 
victor‟s peace. Therefore, it requires more research for a successful policy recommendation in 
such a situation. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: post war Sri Lanka, preventive peacebuilding, conflict prevention, sustainable peace,  
relapse of conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The South Asian island country Sri Lanka has witnessed world„s one of the most protracted and 
brutal internal armed conflicts prolonged for 26 years, which ended up in May 2009 by the 
declaration of the government victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This 
bloody war worth of thousands of lives raises important questions what is this war for? Does this 
end of the war truly mean the end of conflict? Is it the beginning of sustainable peace or is there 
a potential for the conflict to relapse? 
 
 
Sri Lanka is a plural society, where majority are the Sinhalese, who are mainly Buddhist. 
Minority and indigenous groups include Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, Muslims, Veddhas 
and Burghers. However, from the very beginning of independence in 1948, the divide line 
between majority and minority groups became evident. This discrimination gets more explicit by 
the ideology of Sinhala nationalism commenced under the leadership of (Solomon West 
Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike) S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. Constitution, education, employment, 
human rights; in all section Tamil people were oppressed (MRG, 2009). Tamils and to some 
extent Muslims have faced targeted human rights violations including extra-judicial killings, 
enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture of opponents, denial of political aspirations 
and negation of civil and political rights (MRG, 2009). In response to these oppression 
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam, (LTTE) formed in 1976. Marginalization and human rights 
abuses led to increasing militant attacks against State targets. The state backed pogrom against 
Tamils in the capital city Colombo and in other urban areas in July 1983 resulted to thousands of 
killings and several hundred thousand displaced. This is seen as a turning point in the Sri Lankan 
conflict leading to a full blown out war between Tamil militant groups and the largely Sinhala 
Buddhist Sri Lankan army (MRG, 2009). There were many efforts to peace talk, among 
government and LTTE, initiated by them and sometimes facilitated by third parties, but none of 
them saw the light of success. All these deficiencies along with the persecution resulted to the 
devastating war. 
 
 
On 20 January 2009, the Sri Lankan army began the so called humanitarian operation in the area 
of Vanni in the north of the county comprising two districts, Kilinochchi and Mullaittivu, and 
parts of the districts of Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya (Vella andValcárcel, 2009, p.1). The 
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military campaign cornered LTTE rebels on a narrow strip of beach of only 24 square 
kilometers, together with 250,000 civilians which the LTTE used as human shields (The 
Guardian, 2009). Over 20,000 deaths occurred between January 20 and May 19 (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). The exhausted people who managed to escape from the combat zone are still 
being detained in so-called welfare villages controlled by the army and surrounded by barbed 
wire. 
 
 
Research work operated by Minority rights group revealed that in post war Sri Lanka there are 
government attempts to change the demographic patterns of Tamil and Muslim areas through 
various land redistribution schemes, the proliferation of Buddhist religious symbols in minority-
populated areas, the weakening of Tamil and Muslim political parties, and the clampdown on 
minority politics and civil society (MRG, 2011 p.7). Land is being demarcated and sold for 
tourism projects as a part of development projects which is considered as a means of conflict 
resolution by the government. However, the report argues that, a little has been done to the 
promotion and protection of minority rights and freedoms; a serious and credible effort towards 
justice, accountability and reconciliation; and a genuine attempt to present a political solution 
that would satisfy minorities (MRG, 2011, p.7). 
 
 
There has been also extensive militarization in the former war torn area. Even civilian authority 
in the north and east has nearly been replaced by military authority. No civil activity can take 
place without military scrutiny and permission. The resettlement either accused of dense 
corruption. Many who returned found their properties inaccessible due to destruction, de-mining, 
secondary occupation or occupation by the military. Some families living in broken-down 
structures are exposed to the weather and to the risk of theft and physical and sexual abuse 
(MRG, 2011, pp.8-9). 
 
 
The government policy of limited freedom of expression and association resulted to clampdown 
on civil space and civil society leaders and journalists. Representatives of opposition political 
parties have been harassed and the space for dissent continues to be restrained. There is an 
unprecedented climate of fear evident in most parts of the country. Human rights violations such 
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as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention are widely 
reported but are denied by the government. (MRG, 2011, pp. 12-15) 
 
 
It has been already five years the war has ended however, researches show that human rights 
condition of this minority groups are very poor. The question of reconciliation justice and 
accountability remain unresolved. Harsh material conditions, economic marginalization and 
militarism remains prevalent. Höglund and Orjuela argued that the centralized and Sinhalese-
dominated political system, and the Sri Lankan government‟s lack of interest in political reforms 
for power sharing and minority rights suggest that the 2009 victory has failed not only to address 
many of the problems underlying the conflict, rather aggravated some of the grievances as well 
as amplifying support of Tamil Diaspora for separatism (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, pp.3-4). 
This situation refers to the potential risk of the relapse of war. 
 
 
The case of Sri Lanka represents a unique situation in the post war context. Generally post war 
situation provides an opportunity to the parties to rebuild the country towards positive peace 
where preventing the relapse of conflict is key concern. This idea undertakes the conflict 
prevention theory as a broader approach applicable at different stages of conflict cycle and 
considered a less costly and effective way compared to other measures of conflict resolution in 
terms of political, economic and humanitarian aspect. However, Sri Lanka takes a different 
approach than conflict prevention theory. Due to the win of the war by the government and 
absence of „other side‟ apparently challenges the key idea of negotiated settlement of conflict 
prevention and relapse prevention model. The dominant discourse of the Sri Lankan government 
after the war seems that as the conflict is solved there is no need for reconciliation. 
 
 
Therefore, in this circumstances where preventive measures are already on the ground requires 
the assessment of the ongoing process and how powerful it is to establish sustainable peace. 
 
 
The central purpose of this research is to inquire about what conflict prevention measures needed 
in post war Sri Lanka. Moreover, this study also intends to examine how the conflict prevention 
process in post conflict situation works as an effective way to restrain the possibility of arms 
conflict. On the other hand the study inquires the conditions for the sustainable peace in post 
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conflict Sri Lanka and critically assesses conflict prevention measures in this post conflict 
situation. 
 
 
The research questions of the thesis seek to address the post war situation in Sri Lanka. The set 
of question relates to the assessment of the current post war situation in Sri Lanka on the basis of 
theoretical arguments of conflict prevention. In other words, my research question is the 
following. 
 
 
Firstly, what are the current conflict prevention measures in Sri Lanka? Are these measures 
effective enough to establish sustainable peace, if not, why not? 
 
 
Secondly, why it needs preventive measures, when the war already ends in Sri Lanka? Can we 
identify the obstacles of conflict prevention in the victors‟ peace situation of Sri Lanka? Is it 
possible to prevent relapse in such a situation? 
 
 
Wallensteen (2002, p.271) defines conflict prevention as actions that aim to reduce the number 
and scale of armed conflicts by finding solutions at an early stage. Conflict prevention concerned 
with resolving conflict before they become violent. According to Michel S. Lund Conflict 
prevention applies to peaceful situations where substantial physical violence is possible, based 
on typical indicators of rising hostilities. The situation is defined by the potentiality of lethality; 
a) the stage or phase during the emergence of violence when prevention comes into play; and b) 
its methods of engagement, which are geared to the differing drivers of potential conflicts that 
preventive efforts address (Lund, 2008, p.288). 
 
 
Conflict prevention got special importance in 1992 when UN secretary Boutros-Ghali addressed 
the likeliness and seriousness of the threat of internal conflict in his „An Agenda for Peace‟ 
 
(Hedelin, 2007, p.8). The preventive strategies are; Structural prevention and operational 
prevention (Carnegie commission, 1997) and both of them are recognized as equally important. 
This set of strategies address factors that lead to and sustain conflict. Structural prevention (also 
known as deep prevention) is long-term. These measures address pre-conflict conditions through 
economic development, governance programs, and human rights, put in place legal systems, 
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develop democratic institutions and targeted interventions. On the other hand in conflict 
conditions, operational prevention measures seek to prevent more conflict or de-escalate current 
conflict. Operational prevention can also be referred to as direct prevention or preventive action. 
Such measures includes fact-finding and monitoring missions, negotiation, mediation, the 
creation of channels for dialogue among contending groups, preventive deployments and 
confidence building measures and so on. (Ackermann, 2003, p.341) 
 
 
Some research and case studies enable to prescribe the preferable conditions for effective 
preventive actions. These actions should be facilitated by multilateral instruments, supported by 
major international actors, considerable degree of domestic support and capacity for regulation 
(Ackerman, 2003, p.343). However, still there are arguments regarding the successful policy 
recommendation, implementation and institutionalization of conflict prevention. Concerning 
these issues this study examines the effectiveness of preventive actions in post conflict Sri Lanka 
by assessing the major themes of prevention theory. 
 
 
The research explores that the post war conflict prevention in Sri Lanka can be characterized as 
militarization of northern and eastern part of the country, Sinhalization through settlement and 
proliferation of Sinhala religious symbols in the Tamil majority areas and infrastructural 
development accused of undermining indigenous knowledge and priorities, without having 
negotiation with them. It also includes government unwillingness of power devolution and 
international investigation of war crime conducted in the final stage of the war. The policies also 
comprises resettlement of IDPs, develop education and health facilities, gender equalities, 
training, psycho-social healing and integrate the whole nation under a unitary state system. 
Deficiency of good governance, freedom of expression and unwillingness of the government to 
meet the grievances are also important components of post war preventive peacebuilding in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
 
With regard to conflict prevention theory these efforts represents the fact that there is limited 
possibility and will to implement the conflict prevention measures prescribed by the conflict 
prevention literature and policy. For instances, in theoretical aspect demilitarization, 
demobilization, and reintegration, reconstruction and economic development, political power 
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reform, and Justice and reconciliation are the core assumption. However, in Sri Lanka except the 
development sector other area does not get attention as it should be. Instead, the efforts can be 
featured by militarization, political dominance and further centralization of state and the question 
of justice and reconciliation were characterized by asymmetry of power. These could renew the 
grievances. The findings prove that Sri Lanka confronting a grave challenge to succeed in 
establishing sustainable peace and prevent relapse of conflict. 
 
 
The structure of the research is as follows: 
 
 
 
The research is divided into three parts; the first part presents the methodology of the research 
and covers the main theories and approaches to the interpretation of conflict prevention measures 
and its effectiveness to establish sustainable peace. 
 
 
The second part of the research presents the conflict prevention policies in the post war Sri 
Lanka. This includes an analysis of the general preventive peacebuilding efforts, followed by the 
assessment of different actor‟s role. The actors are divided into three parts; the government 
actions, external nation state actors and international organizations and NGOs. 
 
 
The last part of the research encompasses the general conclusions on the characteristics of 
conflict prevention efforts in Sri Lanka, and their effectiveness in establishing sustainable peace 
and preventing the relapse of conflict. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Methodological basis 
 
 
 
The main focus of the research is placed on analysis of different conflict prevention measures 
which will supposed to help to understand how the conflict prevention process in post war 
situation works as an effective way to restrain the possibility of future arms conflict and 
conditions for sustainable peace. The focal idea of my thesis is analyzing the preventive 
peacebuilding in post war Sri Lanka. I will approach the case of preventive peacebuilding in Sri 
Lanka using the „conflict prevention theory‟ as a frame work for this study. 
 
 
This study has a comparative and explanatory approach where the case is central. The conflict 
prevention theory has been chosen because the theory covers wide range of areas; from pre-war 
conflict resolution to post war peacebuilding and preventing the relapse of conflict. This research 
will interpret and compare various primary and secondary sources to have answers of research 
questions. 
 
 
The initial focus of the research will be to identify the causes and underlying roots of the war. 
Then examine the Tamil grievances and the rationales of the government. The history of the 
conflict will be reviewed. The effectiveness of the measures also have been analyzed through the 
prism of the history and current situation. Wallensteen argues that „the success must be very 
context-sensitive and take history, risks, and goals and so on into consideration‟ (Wallensteen, 
2011, p.127). Similarly, the political context and the ability to read it correctly is also an 
important prerequisite for successful prevention. In this regard to assess the preventive measures 
in post conflict Sri Lanka, it is important to analyze the case properly. 
 
 
 
To have a comparative analysis of the causation of the conflict and conflict prevention efforts I 
will assess the field work based reports which is done on the post conflict state of the Tamil 
people, for example Minority Rights Group International: an international NGO, campaigns 
worldwide with around 130 partners in over 60 countries to ensure the rights of disadvantaged 
minority peoples through training, education, legal cases, publications and the media. It has 
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consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and 
observer status with the African Commission for Human and Peoples„ Rights. 
 
 
Human Rights Watch: an independent international organization, works to defend people‟s rights 
worldwide and investigate abuses, expose the facts widely and pressure those with power to 
respect rights and secure justice. 
 
 
International Crisis Group: an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization 
committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict. 
 
 
The permanent Peoples Tribunal: an international opinion tribunal, independent from any state 
authority. It examines cases regarding violation of human rights and the rights of the peoples and 
aims to recover the authority of the peoples when the states and the international bodies failed to 
protect the right of the peoples due to geopolitical reasons or other motivations. Moreover, 
various scholarly work and research papers have been used to analyze the conflict prevention 
efforts in the country. 
 
 
In addition, to perceive the Tamil policy I will review the Tamil newspapers, articles or reports 
published by various Tamil Diaspora organizations as well as election manifesto of Tamil 
political party (TNA) Tamil National Alliance. On the other hand, to examine the government 
policies I intend to cite the constitutional amendments, LLRC report, recent policies regarding 
the reconciliation and developments in the war torn areas. 
 
 
According to Höglund and Oberg (2011, p.9) „information about structural conditions can be 
found in official statistics provided by the governments, international organizations, researches 
and NGOs‟. There are arguments regarding the information availability in war torn country due 
to weak and poor functioning state apparatuses. However, in the case of Sri Lanka the war was 
restricted only in the North and Eastern part of the country, so here the problem is not the state 
body rather the transparency of the government. Even so there are various sources to get 
information on social, economic, political, infrastructure and many other things. Höglund 
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and Oberg (2011, p.9) also argues that scholarly and NGO reports can provide various types of 
information that maybe difficult or impossible to find out elsewhere. 
 
 
News reporting is an indispensable resource for peace research as it provides detailed accounts of 
various conflicts. In using the news reports I will try to select the international news agencies 
reports, as they are more neutral and objective in comparison to national news agencies. Even if, 
they are not totally impartial but the language is neutral, have information on the identity of the 
primary sources and also some indication of the level certainty of the obtained information 
(Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p.49). Collecting news reports on post conflict situation will be 
challenging for me. For instance, generally it is easier to find news on big and extraordinary 
events but in post conflict situation information on the present state of the Tamil people will not 
be available. There are few more things to be considered regarding the news selection. I have to 
be aware that these reports are interpretations and not necessarily facts and these inferences from 
observation can be mistaken (ibid, p.51). Considering these problems Höglund and Oberg 
suggest that since the information is about the parties and their goals and beliefs is generally 
available from the conflict parties, the best source for that kind of information is the parties 
themselves (ibid, p.52). 
 
 
There is another important factor to consider that the intended audience or towards which 
audience the news resource is geared. Sometimes some actions and events being reported 
directed primarily to an outside audience rather than the adversary or the apparent target with an 
intention to hurt their opponent or affect the outcome of the conflict by sending message to 
outside parties. Actors often influence reporting to entice outsiders to actively support their cause 
and oppose their opponent„s cause or to deter outsiders from intervening (Höglund and Oberg, 
2011, p.62). 
 
 
A good strategy to collect information is to use key words and define the concepts clearly. For 
instance I used key words post conflict, reconciliation, human rights, development, 
militarization, political power sharing etc. To minimize selection bias I have tried to use the 
original producer of the news item and to assess the bias, have compared different reports of 
different media. (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, pp. 47-72) 
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As I am not doing field work and preferring desk research by assessing various primary and 
secondary resources so obtaining information is a challenge to me. Due to technological 
development there is massive influx of textual and audiovisual information which also should be 
dealt carefully with the question of authenticity. In this regard firstly „external evaluation‟ is an 
important means to test the authenticity of a source. For instance, when and by whom it was 
made, does it contain signature or other information to validate, where it come from and where it 
was kept, how it came about and with what purpose, these questions will help to prove the origin 
(Dulic in Höglund and Oberg, 2011 pp.37-38). Second trick is internal evaluation to analyze the 
content of the document, its wording, reliability and the biasness. However this part will be 
difficult for me, as I don„t know the Tamil language, so I have preferred the original documents 
which are written by the author himself in English. For example, to understand the present state 
and demands of the Tamils I have examined the speech and articles of the Tamil Diaspora 
leaders and members as well as newsletters, publications and web page of British and Canadian 
Tamil Forum. 
 
 
It is a challenge to the researchers to find a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the 
target phenomenon. Theories must be carefully selected based on their fit with the target problem 
and the extent to which their assumptions are consistent with that of the target problem 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.24). In the context of Sri Lanka I prefer conflict prevention theory as its 
primary idea is to restrain conflict before they start. However, there are arguments that, can war 
be prevented by removing its necessary conditions and controlling the circumstances under 
which they arise. These questions relate to the effectiveness of the prevention process. To better 
understand it needs to assess theoretical theme, especially those which suit for post conflict 
situation. 
 
 
Justification of methodology 
 
 
 
The methodology of interpreting and comparing various primary sources, chosen for the 
research, proved justified as I am not doing field work. For collecting good information, for 
relevant analysis and appropriate hypothesis I prefer NGO reports for instances, International 
Crisis group reports, Minority Rights Group report, International Committee of the Red Cross  
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and Human Rights Watch. In addition, for assessing internal NGO„s and civil society„s activity I 
examine the different individual NGO activities for example, Rural Development Foundation, 
Child Rehabilitation Centre, Jaffna Social Action Centre, National Ethnic Unity Foundation, 
Centre for Peace and Reconciliation, about thirty similar organizations, those are working in Sri 
Lanka. As important international actors Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, USA 
Government printing office report also followed for this purpose. 
 
 
Scholarly researches are also valuable sources of critical information. In this context I followed 
Höglund and Orjeula, Jayadeva Uyongoda (scholar and Professor of Political Science and Public 
Policy at the University of Colombo), Nira Wickramasinghe (Professor of Modern South Asian 
Studies at the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies) and other scholarly reports of 
research centers for instances, Accord, Centre for Peace and Conflict studies, University of St. 
Andrews are followed. Various news reports are also viewed to collect information. 
 
 
In addition, to improve data quality four issues „validity and reliability, documentation, source 
criticism, and triangulation are of special concern‟ (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p.185). Data 
collection efforts begin with theory or theoretical concepts, so for operationalizing there will be 
an effort to conceptualize the terminology of conflict prevention. The operational definition will 
be used to construct indicators that measure the concept, so validity depends on how well the 
operational definition matches the theoretical definition. This operational definition also should 
be consistent that can be applied to the source materials and thus the reliability of the measure. 
With concern to this validity and reliability I will manifest operational definition of conflict 
prevention to collect and compare the information on post war Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Moreover, from ethical consideration having the topic a sensitive issue and security risk in Sri 
Lanka I decided not to operate field work. However, in a situation where there is militarization 
and freedom of expression is restricted how effective will be the field work that is also a matter 
of consideration. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
At the initial stage I have tried to find a theoretical relevant definition to conceptualize the 
phenomenon of interest, which can be used to further a theoretical understanding of the concept 
in focus (Sartori, 1970). Establishing the theoretical structure and operational definition sets the 
direction - which data needed to be collected. There are arguments on conceptualizing or 
defining the conflict prevention. Most of them are too broad that Wallensteen (2011, p.126) 
found them weak on operationalization. Moreover Lund (1996, p.32) argues that more rigorous 
definition should distinguish conflict prevention from other closely related concepts. It should be 
applicable in different contexts and yet specified enough to operationalize. 
 
 
There are arguments that, only to stop a particular situation from escalating is a form of conflict 
management or conflict avoidance (Wallensteen, 2011, p.129). The potential to prevent conflict 
differs in the different phases which is very useful to analyze what resources are necessary and 
when they need to be employed (ibid, p.132). My case study will be a test to evaluate the 
effectiveness of current conflict prevention theory to establish sustainable peace in victor„s peace 
condition. According to Höglund theory driven empirical investigation introduces the demand 
for information upon which theories can be evaluated and explored. Theory and case are 
interrelated; theoretical arguments are needed to make sense of the empirical patterns or 
observations within and across cases (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p. 4). It needs coordination of 
the theory and reality and to gain credibility theory needs empirical confirmation and 
demonstration to have a counterpart in reality (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p.16). 
 
Due to conceptual ambiguity the effectiveness of conflict prevention also yet to be determined. 
 
There are also arguments that should conflict be prevented in the first place? (Ramsbotham et al, 
2011, p.124). Ramsbotham argues that in constructive conflict 'the parties regard them as 
mutually acceptable and conflict outcomes are constructive in so far … these constructive 
outcomes should contribute to well-being and the flourishing of the people affected‟ (ibid). If we 
take this definition in to consideration then the end of the war indicates positive and peaceful 
changes in the society. However, research shows that around 30% of all terminated armed 
conflicts in the period between 1950 and 2005 relapse into violence within five years (Höglund 
and Orjuela, 2011, p.20).  
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This research echo the argument that past civil wars predict future civil war (Ramsbotham et al; 
2011, p.130). In these circumstances post war conflict prevention measures could be a possible 
solution. Compared to conflict management, it seems less costly in political, economic and 
human terms to develop institutional mechanisms that prevent tensions from escalating into 
violent conflict (Lund, 2009, p.287). However, many studies examine the potentiality of conflict 
prevention even if it is difficult to measure that the preventive action had an impact on the course 
of events (Wallensteen, 2011, p.108). 
 
 
Although theory provides underlying logic of the social phenomenon by explaining the key 
operators and processes, nevertheless, the simplified explanations of the reality is sometimes not 
adequate (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.29). In addition pitfalls in the theory could make difficulties on 
its implications, so improvement of the real circumstances of post conflict Sri Lanka depends on 
the improvement of the preventive agenda. To improve the preventive agenda it needs to assess 
the success and failure of preventive action. 
 
 
There are scholarly arguments that preventive measures have to be seen as a continuum of 
several levels of success and, furthermore, effects have to be seen in at least a medium-term 
perspective (Wallensteen, 2011, p.129). For instance, firstly, immediate avoidance of escalation 
to armed conflict is minimum success, secondly, no additional serious dispute among the parties 
(for at least five years, as a way of operationalizing this), where the situation will be measured by 
assessing the change of the frequency and severity of the following disputes. The initiation of 
peace process would be maximum criterion for success (ibid, p.130). If we consider this 
dependent variable, then in Sri Lanka it has been five years the war ended and there are no armed 
violence over there, so it can be counted as medium success of preventive measures. However, 
this cannot ensure that, there is no potential for relapse of conflict. In this circumstances, 
conceptualize the probability of relapse war as dependent variable will better fit my case. 
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The limitations of methodological perspective 
 
 
 
Collecting and evaluating information and analyzing the case on their basis are problematic in 
conflict-ridden societies. There are common risks of propaganda; misrepresented, incomplete 
and biased information or narratives (Höglund and Obreg, 2011, p.112). Considering these 
difficulties I have tried to select the sources. 
 
 
Another limitation to my study is field work; having the security problem and controversiality of 
this Tamil issue field work kept out of consideration. The ethical consideration is very important 
in peace research. The topic of the research is often sensitive both to the participants in the study 
and to the government that experienced the conflict, so these ethical dilemmas are very acute for 
field researchers (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p.7). According to Höglund and Oberg (2011, p. 
114) in post war context the legacy of violence, changing power relations and continued 
repression of regimes can also hamper or influence the research process. There are several field 
work based researches on Sri Lankan Tamil issue which faced challenges. For example, Kristine 
Höglund herself could not operate her field study properly as she intended and she had to narrow 
down the scope of her study (ibid, 2011, p.118). However, it is easier to operate field work for 
the NGOs and scholars of reputed institutions but as a student it will be difficult for me to have 
field work for master thesis. Höglund and Oberg indicate some problem concerning this issue 
such as, „people expressed fear about these issues and researchers working on these issues can 
easily be considered as spy, terrorist sympathizer, human rights activist and suspicious to the 
authorities‟ (ibid, 2011, p.125). Considering these insecure research environment and sensitive 
research topic of Tamil I found it risky to conduct field work. 
 
 
In addition, Freedom of expression is another challenge to my case. There are examples of arrest 
and indictment of journalists in Sri Lanka, which illustrates the lack of freedom of information 
and expression. In this restricted situation it will be hard to get reliable information and there is 
potential risk of bias. 
 
 
Moreover, I am using NGO reports which is much influential than the news reports. However, 
they often have their own agendas and restrictions that might influence their reporting 
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 (Höglund and Oberg, 2011, p.52). Finally, language barrier, authenticity of the interpretation of 
events and terminology also poses obstacles. 
 
 
As a comparative analysis this research would be an important source to understand the 
deficiencies of post war conflict prevention efforts in Sri Lanka in particular and as a part of 
qualitative research can contribute to reveal the drawbacks of conflict prevention theory, in 
general, in post conflict settings. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical analysis of conflict prevention measures 
 
 
 
Post war Sri Lanka has been exposed as one of the unique cases which appeared as a challenge to 
the well-established peace keeping, conflict management and conflict prevention efforts. The end 
of the world„s one of the most protracted and brutal internal war has been met with various peace 
building and conflict prevention measures. Generally conflict prevention refers to such a 
condition where conflicting parties reach a negotiated agreement on the basis of mutual interest. 
However, scholars like Höglund and Orjuela (2011, p.2) found that, the victor„s peace where 
asymmetric power relation between the winner and losing party defines the post war situation, 
conflict prevention will render a tool for continued domination and containment of conflicts. 
 
In addition, the failures of numerous peace initiatives prior to the war of 2009 fortify current 
challenges to establish sustainable peace in the post war Sri Lanka and anticipate the potentiality 
of relapse of further conflict. 
 
 
2.1. The concept of conflict prevention 
 
 
 
In assessing the post war preventive peacebuilding process it may prove constructive to elaborate 
the idea of conflict prevention mechanism. Preventing the violent conflict remains one of the 
most difficult challenges of the twenty first century. The emergence of new international attitude 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s approached as regional conflicts in the third world were viewed 
as a regional or global problems which should be addressed multilaterally. The necessity of 
containment of these violent conflicts shed the light on the urgent requirement to build an 
appropriate normative framework for the role of international community. As a result conflict 
prevention draws the central attention of international actors. (Melander and Pigache, 2007, p.1) 
 
 
Although the idea of „conflict prevention‟ emerged as the central concept at the end of twentieth 
century however, it can be traced back in Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815 to prevent new wars by 
creating demilitarized areas and neutral states. Moreover, the United Nations emerged with the 
ambition of preventing conflict. The UN charter in chapter VI and VII includes various 
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coercive and non-coercive measures to prevent violent conflicts. The Secretary-Generals of UN had a 
great contribution to strengthen the idea. For instance Dag Hamarskjold inaugurated the term 
„preventive diplomacy‟ in1960 through the „Agenda for Peace‟ and defined it as prevent the spillover 
of regional conflict to the superpower arena, which was modified by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1990 
as the use of diplomatic technique to prevent disputes from arising, from escalating into armed 
conflict and armed conflict from spreading. Later on along with this to enhance the UN 
responsibility and role Kofi Annan stressed the shift of „culture of reaction‟ towards „culture of 
prevention‟ in 2001 and 2006. (Melander and Pigache, 2007, p.2) 
 
 
Nowadays conflict prevention is been recognized as a political strategy to establish more stable 
and predictable international environment through effective response by states and organizations 
to emergent, escalating and ongoing conflicts by means of economic, political and military 
techniques. (Carment and Schnabel, 2004, p.5, v.2) 
 
 
Despite the wide range interest and adoption of the preventive ideas researchers still could not 
agree upon the definition of „conflict prevention‟. According to Wallensteen and Moller (2003, 
pp.4-5) definitions differ mainly according to the aim of prevention: should it address only the 
immediate causes of conflict or also its underlying roots, or both, from reducing violence to 
resolving the incompatibility, the time perspective (short or long term), the means, and with 
regard with their coerciveness. Moreover, the conceptual confusion also linked with the conflict 
stage when the prevention should be implemented is an important determinant. For instances, 
Ackermann examined the scope of conflict prevention, whether it should be limited to the early 
and non-escalatory stages of conflict, or also encompass the escalation and post-conflict stages of 
a conflict (Ackermann, 2003, p.341). 
 
 
In the context of this study conflict prevention can be defined according to Michael Lund‟s 
suggestion: 
 
“conflict prevention entails any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate and 
interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to 
strengthen the capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviating the 
underlying problems that produce them, including forestalling the spread of hostilities 
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into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have not occurred 
recently and where recent largely terminated conflicts could recur. Depending on how 
they are applied, it can include the particular methods and means of any policy sector, 
whether labeled prevention or not (e.g. sanctions, conditional aid, mediation, structural 
adjustment, democratic institution building etc), and they might be carried out by global, 
regional, national or local levels by any governmental or non-governmental actor.” 
 
(Lund in Carment and Schnabel, 2004, p.5, v.2) 
 
 
 
This definition refers conflict prevention as a broad concept and malleable as a policy; it is  
Multi-sectoral can be applied at different phases of conflict by a range of actors. 
 
 
For example, Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse map the conflict cycle and general conditions 
that reduce the likelihood of conflict. The figure also shows the scope of prevention at different 
stages of conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conflict prevention and the conflict cycle (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.124) 
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1-3 preventing violent conflict (Deep Prevention, Light prevention, crisis management)  
4-6 Preventing the intensification, prolongation and spread of violent conflict 
 
7-9 Preventing relapse into violent conflict 
 
 
 
To explain the model of conflict cycle and responses a combination has been made of Galtung‟s 
ideas of conflict and violence and escalation/de-escalation phases. The escalation and de-
escalation model is important component for scholars to match appropriate conflict resolution 
strategies. According to Galtung‟s model conflict can be viewed as a triangle with contradiction, 
attitude, and behavior (Galtung 1996, p.72). Galtung emphasizes on the presence of all these 
three components in a full conflict. The conflict process is dynamic and unpredictable in which 
structure, attitudes and behavior constantly changes and influences one another. During the 
conflict escalation process new issues and conflict parties can emerge, internal power struggles 
can alter tactics and goals and the situation can be further complicated through the emergence of 
secondary conflict. As a result it becomes difficult to address the original, core conflict. 
Similarly, the de-escalation also experiences the changing dynamics which could be resulted 
with advances in one area or at one level being offset by relapse at others and third parties 
influence the outcomes in unforeseen ways. (Ramsbotham et.al., 2011, pp. 11-13) 
 
 
As it is shown in the figure that the conflict escalation faces begin from the initial differences as 
a part of social developments and emerge as original contradiction and reached to the stage of 
polarization in which antagonistic parties form and conflict becomes manifest, and culminate 
through the outbreak of direct violence and war. At these early stages of differences to 
polarization, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall suggest deep prevention, light prevention and 
crisis management measures as preventive strategies. Early warning about the signs of conflict 
and early response to them, inter-group dialogue and reconciliation, preventive diplomacy, arms 
embargo, economic sanctions, muscular mediation, conditional budget support, human rights 
capacity building are strategies were established to reduce the potential inter or intrastate 
conflicts (Lund, 2008, p.292) 
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The failure of early efforts and the changing dynamics culminating to violence and war and at 
this point the aim is preventing the intensification, prolongation and spread of violent conflict 
through measures which includes threat of force or rapid reaction forces. Finally, at the de-
escalation stages after having an agreement the aim is to prevent the relapse of the violent 
conflict. Structural preventive measures are mostly suitable for this purpose. 
 
 
Höglund and Orjuela suggest that for long term stability of a war torn country conflict prevention 
is twofold undertaking. „First, it includes preventing a relapse to violent conflict, and second; it  
includes constructing a self-sustained peace‟ (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.22). These are the 
overlapping ideas of operational prevention and structural prevention; the distinction made by 
the Carnegie Commission which has been recognized by the Secretary General‟s 2001 report on 
the prevention of armed conflict. 
 
 
Operational prevention which also refers to the „light prevention‟ (Ramsbotham et al, 2011, 
p.135) comes into action when disputes are close to the point of violence. It aims at giving an 
immediate answer to an imminent crisis. The objective of prevention is very sharp and 
specifically targets the reduction of violence between identified actors, in a rather short-term 
perspective. Generally the responsibility to take constructive strategy and to play decisive role in 
the conflict falls mainly on the protagonists themselves. However, it is difficult for the parties 
themselves to find nonviolent solution of their own since they are in a conflicting situation so in 
many cases they need outsiders help. Scholars for example, Ackermann (1996, 2000) Lund & 
Mehler (1999) identify fact-finding and monitoring missions, negotiation, mediation, the creation 
of channels for dialogue among contending groups, preventive deployments, and confidence-
building as the measures of operational prevention. (Ackermann, 2003, p.341) 
 
 
On the other hand Structural prevention or peace building (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p.13) 
 
(or deep prevention, Ramsbotham et.al 2005) involves a wider perspective, a larger scope of 
targets and actions in a longer term (Melander and Pigache, 2007, p.13). It incorporates the 
measures that facilitate governance, adherence to human rights, and economic, political, and 
societal stability, as well as civil society building. The aim is not only to reduce violence but 
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largely to address the root causes and the environment that gives birth to it and the final goal is to 
ensure human security, well-being and justice (Miall, Ramsbotham& Woodhouse, 2011, p.129). 
 
Michael S. Lund in his paper „Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and 
Practice‟ reveals a structure of various preventive instruments: 
 
 
   A Priori Measures Ad Hoc Measures 
   (Generic norms and regimes (Hands on‟ actions targeted to 
   for classes of countries) particular places and times) 
    
Structural Measures  Standards for human rights, Economic reforms and 
(Address basic societal, good governance, assistance, 
institutional and policy factors Environmental regimes, Enterprise promotion, 
affecting conflict/peace) World Trade Organization Natural resource management, 
   negotiations, Decentralization, 
   OAS and AU‟s protocols on Federalism, 
   protecting democracy, Long-term observer missions, 
   International organization Group assimilation policies, 
   membership or affiliations Aid for elections, legislatures 
    Human rights and conflict 
    resolution education, 
    Aid for police and judiciary, 
    Executive power-sharing 
    Security sector reform 
    
Direct Measures  International Criminal Court Human rights capacity- 
(Address more immediate War Crimes Tribunals Building 
Behaviors   Special Rapporteurs for Inter-group dialogue, 
affecting conflict/peace) Human Rights Reconciliation 
   Arms control treaties Conditional budget support 
   Global regulation of illegal Fact-finding missions 
   trade (e.g. Kimberly Process Arms embargoes 
   for „conflict diamonds‟) Peace radio‟ 
   EU Lone and Good offices, facilitation, 
     
   21  
 Cotonou processes on track-two diplomacy 
 democracy, governance, and „Muscular‟ mediation 
 Human Preventive deployment 
   Rights Economic sanctions 
  Threat of force 
  Rapid reaction forces 
   
 
 
Figure 2: Taxonomy of illustrative conflict prevention instruments (Lund, 2009, p. 292). 
 
 
 
AS it is shown in the table Lund finds these instruments are actually be operating under different 
aliases though features into them perform prevention effectively. 
 
 
Therefore, the task of conflict prevention is not only confined to the „direct prevention‟ to 
particular disputes between emergent parties in the foreground but also as creating capable states 
and immunizing societies against violence through structural prevention efforts at many levels in 
the background. The term preventive peacebuilding is sometimes now used to suggest that many 
of the same wide spectrum of sectoral policies that have been used in post-conflict settings. 
(Lund, 2003, p.13) 
 
 
Ramsbotham refers to Dan Smith‟s (2004) assessment of a framework of peacebuilding: 
 
 
 
 Security: This includes disarmament; demobilization and reintegration of combatants and 
child combatants; security sector reform; de-mining; small arms and light weapons; 


 Political framework: Democratization of parties, media, NGOs, and inculcation of a 
democratic culture; good governance via accountability, rule of law, justice system; 
institution building; promotion of human rights; are the main features of political actions. 
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 Socio-economic foundations: This sector ranges from physical reconstruction, economic, 
health and education infrastructure, to repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs and food 
security; 


 Reconciliation and justice: This embraces dialogue between leaders of antagonistic groups; 
grassroots dialogue; other bridge building activities, truth and reconciliation commissions, 
trauma therapy and healing. (cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.229) 
 
 
Therefore, to analyze the effectiveness of measures to establish sustainable peace in a post war 
setting the relevant and applicable theoretical measures has been incorporated. 
 
 
With this regard conflict prevention entails all forms of measures which range from peace 
enforcement during the violence conflict, to peacebuilding after the end of war. These 
characteristics also can be proved by the aims of preventive actions: 
 
First of all, prevent the emergence of violent conflict by creating capable states with 
representative governance based on the rule of law, with widely available economic opportunity, 
social safety nets, protection of fundamental human rights, and robust civil societies.  
 
Second, prevent ongoing conflicts from spreading which is done by creating political, economic, 
and, if necessary, military barriers to limit the spread of conflict within and between states.  
 
Third, prevent the reemergence of violence through creating a safe and secured environment in 
the aftermath of conflict and the achievement of a peace settlement. Simultaneous, immediate 
steps will also be necessary to restore legitimate political authority, to install functioning police, 
judicial, and penal systems, and to integrate external and internal efforts to restore essential 
services and restart normal economic activity. (Carnegie commission, 1997, p.2) 
 
Due to catch-all feature of conflict prevention this thesis put an effort to sort out a more practical 
understanding of the terms and measures. As a result it will be easier to assess the preventive 
peacebuilding efforts in post-war Sri Lanka. 
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2.2. Sustainable peace through justice and reconciliation 
 
 
 
Regarding the employment of preventive measures and involvement in instabilities Lund finds it 
important to clarify the operational distinctions of different stages of conflict. Therefore, he 
differentiates between stages and their operational and institutional responses such as: 
 
„peacetime diplomacy or politics works during eras of durable and stable peace, preventive 
diplomacy or conflict prevention preferable during areas of unstable peace, crisis diplomacy or 
crisis management during a crisis situation and peacemaking or conflict management comes into 
action during war‟. (Lund, 1996, p.386) 
 
 
If we take this classification into account to define Sri Lankan post war situation, it can be said 
that it is in the era of unstable peace where preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention measures 
are needed. However, it brings about the question of defining sustainable and unstable peace. In 
identifying the sustainable peace Lund argues that along with the peoples physical security form 
not being killed there are other conditions which includes the elimination of major known direct 
or indirect causes of intra-state armed conflicts as well as minimizing the likelihood of relapse of 
conflict. With this regard he also points some criteria of sustainable peace: 
 
 
1. “Absence of actual or threatened widespread physical violence from armed force, including 
repression (mere peace)  
 
 
  
2. Accommodative political processes that allow access to decisions affecting the population‟s 
lives and provide mechanisms for addressing social grievances of the kind that otherwise 
could produce major upheavals  
 
 
3. Functioning government sufficient to provide essential public services, including security  
 
 
 
4. Sufficient economic development to discernibly improve the well-being of most people in 
the society and begin to reduce widespread poverty.  
 
 
5. Absence of egregious social divisions and material inequalities”. (Lund, 2003, p.26)  
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In addition, Lund reveals some value and ideal based criteria for post war sustainable peace 
which are codified in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), for instances: absence of 
widespread crime and social dislocations, restitution for or acknowledgement of past wrongs to 
promote social healing and inter-group reconciliation and increased gender equality (Lund, 2003, 
p.26). This refers to the negotiated settlement and addressing the grievances for sustainable 
peace. 
 
 
The situation also embraces Galtung‟s (1990) idea of negative peace which refers to the 
cessation of direct violence coupled with repression, depression, exploitation and injustice 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011, p.12). It is curative, pessimistic and peace not always by peaceful 
means. On the other hand positive peace is the absence of structural violence where legitimacy 
and justice are the key ideas. It is optimistic, structural integration, preventive and peace by 
peaceful means. Thus, establishment of peace are intertwined with the elimination of violence. 
Although defining this positive and negative peace brings about huge arguments among the 
scholars and leads the researchers to move from the negative peace or the elimination of direct 
violence towards positive peace or eradication of structural violence. Galtung places positive 
peace at higher ideal than negative peace. In addition, rather dealing with the narrow vision of 
reducing direct and structural violence he gives importance to understand the conditions of 
preventing violence. (Cited in Grewal, 2003, pp.3-4) Some scholars consider justice as one of 
the most important elements to transform from negative peace to truly positive and sustainable 
and durable peace (Lehti and Saarinen, 2014, p.68). 
 
 
 
Negative peace Justice Positive peace 
   
Absence of violence Rule of law Long-term reconciliation 
   
 Truth commissions/trials  
   
 Reparation/distributive justice  
   
 
 
Figure 3: From negative to positive peace (Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p.251) 
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Therefore, reconciliation is a crucial component for conflict prevention. This is assumed as the 
heart of deep peacemaking and cultural peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p.246). 
Reconciliation refers to restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with 
radical differences. Negotiation between overlapping interests opens the door to settlement and to 
overcome the structural injustice which creates an enduring space for further transformations.  
 
However, Ramsbotham finds reconciliation very challenging after violent conflict that in the war-
torn circumstances, where relations have been severed, norms are violated, identities are distorted, 
too many traumas endured, parties are not in a status to sit and negotiate with adversary. With this 
regard, to build the present ground of a shared future it needs to deal with the past. This brings 
about the question of restoring justice to overcome the challenges of psychological trauma and 
creates the space to deal with the subject of psycho-social healing. As the invisible effects are 
assumed harder to treat than physical effects, thus it requires an attempt to rebuild the social 
relations after large scale violence and war. (Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p.249) With this regard 
Andrew Rigby in his book „Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence (2001)‟ outlines the 
approach: firstly, amnesia or „forgive-and forget‟ which is perceived and followed by some societies 
easily to achieve reconstitution of relations between former enemies without travails of justice, in 
contrast vengeance‟ embrace private revenge on the others and another alternative lies between these 
two is public justice‟ which refers to truth commission and compensatory reparations. Along similar 
lines, Rama Mani in her book „Beyond retribution: Seeking Justice in the shadows of War‟ (2002, 
pp.3-11) distinguishes the public justice into three interdependent dimensions which provides 
important alternatives to private vengeance and open up the way to eventual reconciliation. The first 
one is legal justice or rule of law. 
 
 
This war affected entire apparatus of the justice system needs to be rebuilt. Secondly, rectificatory 
justice „will deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity, past abuses and human rights 
violations. Finally, distributive justice‟ will address the structural and systemic injustices, mainly 
deals with the underlying root causes of conflict such as political and economic discrimination and 
inequalities of distribution. (Cited in Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p.250) 
 
 
 
 
26
Connie Peck in the report „Sustainable peace: the role of the UN and regional organizations in 
preventing conflict‟ (1998, p.15) which has been published as a part of Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict„series points that for a sustainable peace it will need a long term 
approach to address the structural causes and foster institutions to promote distributive and 
procedural justice to make violent conflict less likely. 
 
 
The procedural justice refers to transparency, fare representation, and fare play as well as 
voluntary agreement in the negotiation process while distributive justice covers equality, 
proportionality, compensation and need (Albin and Druckman cited in Lehti et al, 2014, pp.69-
70). 
 
 
However, some find this idea of just-peace as dubious and confusing. This triggers the debate 
 
„Peace or justice‟ as some finds contradiction between peace and justice. Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall argue that: whether the goal should be to establish peace at any price to 
end the bloodshed where power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and 
democratic principles, or should dive for the objective of democratic peace which respects 
human rights, though that might prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the time that it 
takes to reach a negotiated solution? (Cited in Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p, 250)  
According to Pauline Baker (1996, p.564) conflict managers‟ goal is peace in contrast 
democratizers‟ goal is justice. Similarly, Mani refers justice as a multidimensional opening space 
for reconciliation and to make it possible it needs sufficient acceptance by the former enemies of 
the legitimacy of post war rule of law, sufficient correlation of accounts to allow truth 
commissions and trials to resolve issues of rectificatory justice, and ample bridging of 
differences through compensation, reparation or structural adjustments to deliver adequate 
prospects of improved distributive justice in future. (Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, p, 251) 
 
Regarding the relation of justice and peace Mona Fixdal points that the ideas should not be 
equated rather they are two different values which are much more supportive to each other than 
undermining. According to her studies in some cases the goal of justice can lead people to reject 
peace proposals. 
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Concerning this issue Avishai Margalit notes that peace can be justified without being just which 
supports the value of negative peace. Nevertheless, Fixdal argues that in some situation justice is 
more important than peace and a minimum degree of justice is the prerequisite for peace (cited in 
Lehti et al, 2014, pp.68-69). 
 
At this point Lisa Schirch (2002, p.3) finds „just-peacebuilding‟ approach as the point of 
departure to address the concerns of both fields. She defines the features of just-peacebuilding: 
which describe conflict as the consequence of unmet human needs. Its goal is to meet the human 
needs and human rights of all groups through a variety of short-term, intermediate and long-term 
approaches. This long term approach includes a range of peacebuilding processes as well as 
human rights and conflict resolution approaches. It takes a partial stance to values but impartial 
to people. Herein justice assumed within restorative framework and focuses on restoring victims 
and their needs and holding the offenders accountable to victims needs. At the same time tries to 
address offender needs. Just-peace effectively reduces direct violence which eventually plays 
crucial role in accomplishing long-term goals. Schirch points that the outcome of peacebuilding 
efforts are unlikely to be sustained if peace is not accompanied by distributive justice where 
resources and decision making are shared. Just-peace exists in a sustainable set of structures and 
processes with an absence of direct and structural violence. (Schirch, 2002, p.4) 
 
Correspondingly, transitional justice is another option offered to establish long term and 
sustainable solution. According to Wendy Lambourne (2007, p.1) transitional justice should be 
assumed as a critical component in peace building which aim is to rebuild institutions and 
relationships to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict and violations of human rights. This 
transitional justice facilitates sustainable peace through the transformation in social, economic 
and political structure and relationships. 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 2004 defines transitional justice as a full range of processes 
and judicial or non-judicial mechanisms associated with a society„s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation (cited in Lambourne, 2007, p.2). Lambourne acknowledges Charles Call„s 
(2004) explanation of transitional justice as a process where societies transforming from 
repressive rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities, overcome social divisions or seek  
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reconciliation and create justice systems to prevent future human rights atrocities. John paul 
Lederach (2000) confess that the ending of armed conflict and reducing the threats of further 
violence and construction of the condition for peace is an essential base for peace building. 
However, the process will be accomplished when there will be transformation of the 
relationships between people, because it is a difficult task to create confidence in the new regime 
and to overcome the psychological barriers between people created by the experience of war. 
(Cited in Lambourne, 2007, pp.11-12) Moreover, the particular cultural and conflict context and 
the effective participation of civil society should be recognized for successful transformative 
process and sustainable peace. (Lambourne, 2007, p12) 
 
 
Observation of Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman show that peace treaties are more durable 
when principle of equality is recognized. They offer a great importance of third party in the 
peace process and how they treat the adversaries or participants to the negotiation. Thus, 
according to their observation agreement facilitated by the third parties on the basis of justice is 
the key element of successful conflict resolution and durable peace(Albin and Druckman cited in 
Lehti et al, 2014, pp.69-70).  
However, Øyvind Østerud has argued that, civil war ending to the victory of one party is more 
durable than mediated or negotiated settlement. In addition, if the assessment of the durability of 
peace agreement is measured within five years period, statics shows that negotiated settlements 
has greater tendency of the renewal of violence in comparison to peace followed military victory 
(cited in Lehti, 2014, p.67). According to this approach in Sri Lanka it should be a durable peace 
as the government won the war. This poses question whether in Sri Lanka truly establish 
sustainable peace or not. 
 
 
 
2.3. Addressing the root causes as preventive instrument 
 
 
 
Connie Peck also emphasizes on understanding the root causes of conflict as the first point of 
departure in developing an agenda for peace. Likewise Schnabel notes that the approach of long 
term prevention of potential violence should be guided on the basis of proven knowledge of the 
most common root causes of violence.  
 
29
Schnabel and Carment in their book „Conflict prevention from Rhetoric to Reality‟ present an 
assessment of the sources of conflict. According to them researchers and policymakers seek the 
causes in order to develop early warning indicators and to define appropriate policy instruments 
and strategies, because observed growth of a factor which cause violent conflict could constitute 
a warning (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, p.22). 
 
Deploying the analysis of Waltz the foundation of the level of causation has been distinguished 
into three parts: the structure of international system, the internal structures of states and the 
nature of the human individual. To have relevant analysis state level sources of conflict will be 
discussed in this part. This relates with the intermediate (between the globe and the individual) 
units can be defined as regions, as states or as groups. Rubin identifies state-level factors 
equivalent to structural, cultural or institutional sources of conflict. (Cited in Schnabel et.al, 
2004, p. 28) 
 
 
This idea of root causes also intertwined with the concept of justice and human needs. As Peck 
points that the systematic frustration of human needs is a major cause of conflict. Grievances and 
feelings of injustice are likely to grow when individual and group needs for physical safety and 
well-being, access to political and economic participation, and cultural or religious expression 
are threatened or frustrated over long periods of time, especially when a group feels that it is 
being unfairly disadvantaged compared to other groups. (Peck, 1998, p.16) Therefore, to prevent 
the conflict the oppressive culture need to be ameliorated. Peck refers that since the state is the 
responsible authority to provide physical and cultural safety and to regulate political and 
economic access, the prime objective of group mobilization tends to be political access. In cases 
where governments recognize, listen to, and accommodate dissatisfied groups, grievances may 
be lessened or resolved. Problems arise, however, when governments ignore or repress these 
concerns. (Peck, 1998, p.16) 
 
Rubin reveals that, among the characteristics of states and political processes the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to protect human rights or even basic security for citizens are most 
provocative to violence.  
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In addition, when important state institutions as well as political parties are ethnically based 
poses dangerous sign, because both state administration and political competition tend to turn 
into intergroup contests. Access to the resources is important determinants of conflict. We can 
get a clear idea regarding resource based conflict from the World Bank economist Paul Collier„s 
assessment of the types of motivation in civil wars: greed and grievance. However, it is difficult 
to reveal the exact motivation because self-interested leaders may deploy the discourses of 
grievance to disguise the greed. Along with this perceived unjustified relative deprivation or 
change in the degree of deprivation or its legitimacy promotes conflict. (Rubin in Schnabel et.al, 
2004, p. 28) 
 
 
„The Minorities at Risk‟ study shows that most of the conflicts begin with non-violent movement 
and escalate in violent conflict. This escalation occurs quickly in authoritarian regime because of 
its repressive nature on the other hand, the transformation is slower in democracies. The study 
also confronts the idea of religious extremism as the major source of communal violence. 
Supporting the statement Gurr also argues that since religious differences exist between many 
minorities and dominant groups, this is more often a contributory factor, rather than a root cause 
of conflict. (Peck, 1998, p.30) 
 
 
Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue when physical security and well-being are incorporated with 
acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and fear for the future then the situation resulted to 
ethnic conflict. In addition, the demands for communal and cultural identity are important factors 
of conflict. Here communal identity refers to the individual quest within a group to share some 
combination of a common language, customs, religion, myth of descent, history, collective name, 
and association with a specific territory (which the group may or may not possess at the time) 
Peck referring to Esman, (1990b) and Lake and Rothchild (1996) points that in modern society, 
the denial or satisfaction of needs for physical security, recognition of group identity, and access 
to scarce resources is largely regulated by the state. Thus, one of the first demands of identity 
groups tends to be for access to the political process. (Peck, 1998, p.30) 
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The state also can be a crucial predictor of conflict. Sometimes dominant group or groups use the 
state as a means to maximize their own interest and limit access of non-dominant groups to 
political and social institutions. Moreover, factors such as state weakness, poor resource base or 
rapid population growth also contribute to ethnic conflict. (Peck, 1998, p.31) 
 
 
Study shows that historical grievances sometimes provoke contemporary conflicts. Within the 
historical process four actions such as conquest, state-building, migration and economic 
development can be delineated. Due to conquest and colonization there is a process of forcibly 
incorporating people with new entities which causes physical and cultural decimation. Wherein 
unequal size and advance groups are thrust together and this uneven situation creates lasting 
legacies of intergroup grievance. (Peck, 1998, p.32) Along with this, government efforts of 
homogenous state building resulted to mass population transfer and genocide which inseminate 
the scars of interethnic hostility. On the other hand, forced assimilation policy also known as 
cultural genocide; state ban the use of particular language, religion or custom. According to Ryan 
(1990) the coerced assimilation has backfired, stimulating ethnic revival or secessionist 
movements. (Cited in Peck, 1998, p.33) 
 
 
The Minorities at Risk Study provides useful data about the kinds of contemporary grievances 
that lead groups to advocate demands for autonomy, greater political access within states, and 
greater economic or cultural rights. Groups which demand political autonomy naturally want 
control over their own governance. They may desire total secession and independence in a new 
state, union with a kindred group elsewhere (in a neighboring state, for example), or greater 
regional autonomy within the existing state. One of the strongest historical factor predicting 
demands for autonomy is that the group had once governed its own affairs. In particular pressure 
by the dominant group on group lands and resources, and on cultural distinctiveness intensify the 
autonomy demand more. (Peck, 1998, p.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   32 
 
 
Another important factor is demands for greater political access which ranges from greater 
participation in political decision making at central level to the demand for equal civil rights or 
the demand for replacement of unpopular local officials or policies. Access to political rights will 
enable them to determine their economic, social and cultural rights. In addition, group 
discrimination often leads minority groups to demand access to political decision making. (Peck, 
1998, p.35) 
 
 
Demand for greater economic rights also important element to mobilize conflict. Economic 
rights may include a call for larger share of public funds; improved working conditions; access to 
higher status jobs; better salaries; better education; access to positions in the military, police, and 
government bureaucracies; or the protection or return of group lands or other resources. Groups 
may also want access to wealth, including land, capital credit, foreign exchange, and business 
licenses (Peck, 1998, p.35).  
A study by the United Nations University refers to a process of conflict where elites use political 
and socioeconomic inequality (termed as „horizontal‟ inequality) among identity groups as a 
basis for mobilizing people to compete for power and resources. Impoverishment without social 
capital could end up by individual violent crime but, when economic fault lines coincide with 
cultural groups or political territories then economic disparities are far more likely to translate 
into conflict. (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, pp.28-30) 
 
Moreover, demand for social and cultural rights which related to mainly language, religious 
belief and practice, educational settings, equal status in legal matters and community treatment 
or protection from threats or attacks by other groups are important causes. However, the most 
important cause of conflict is the demand for basic human needs and human security. Rubin 
argues that poverty, inequality, or cultural differences do not themselves cause conflict rather, 
cultural values and differences provide political resources that can be used for different purposes, 
including conflict. Every culture includes a variety of potential symbolic and political resources 
for both conflict and peace that cultural elites transform into political resources. (Rubin in 
Schnabel and Carment, 2004, pp.30-31) 
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Effective democratic institutions are believed to be an effective way of conflict prevention. 
Research shows that, characteristics of the state itself are strong sources of conflict. Rubin argues 
that authoritarianism and repression are modes of dealing with conflict through avoidance or 
suppression, thus they may prevent conflict but that is not the goal of preventive action. 
According to him consolidated democracy prevents violent conflict though, the processes of 
democratization can provoke it, because holding elections without adequate safeguards for the 
security and interests of those who lose and without effective restraints on those who may wish 
to cheat, cannot establish peace. This election may constitute another arena of lawless contest of 
power. However, finally democracy based on power sharing and compensation for loser can be a 
better option to prevent conflict. (Rubin in Schnabel et.al, 2004, p.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4. Addressing human security as an instrument of conflict prevention 
 
 
 
Different studies respond to the statement that human security compliments state security. UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan (2000) points out a comprehensive role of human security in 
peace. To him in its broadest sense human security not only refers to the absence of violent 
conflict rather it encompasses human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, access 
to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities to fulfill their 
own potential. It also steps towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing 
conflict. The concept of human security embraces diverse circumstances and without protecting 
human security thinking of the national or territorial security seems insufficient. Schnabel refers 
human security as a key ingredient for just and peaceful world order and emphasizes on the 
constant investment to maintain and improve existing levels of stability, peace and justice. 
Therefore, the stabilization and management of sustainable peace are crucial components of 
long-term preventive approach. (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, p.110, v.2) 
 
 
Schnabel finds human security as a norm in a well-functioning political system where citizens 
have levers to keep those in power under control, and to ensure that they spend a substantial  
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portion of their resources to secure the people„s interest. People are not interested to wage war 
with their neighbors. A culture of peace prevails when citizens enjoy good, accountable and 
responsible governance. (ibid, 2004, p.118, v.2) 
 
 
According to Schnabel and Carment (2004, p.109, v.2) most of the conflict„s root can be found 
in the structural violence which is the expression of persisting threats to individuals „human 
security. 
He also argues that, the long term prevention of potential violence should be guided by the idea 
of resolving the root causes of conflict. Hence, appropriate structural prevention requires the 
fulfillment of the human security needs of all members of the society at the same time it needs to 
strengthen the institutions which foster democracy, development, human rights and peaceful 
relations between group and states (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, p.112, v.2). Similarly, Edward 
Azar argues in his studies that in protracted social conflict such as in Sri Lanka, the communal 
groups engage into prolonged and violent struggle for such basic needs as security, recognition 
and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. In particular, 
Azar identified security needs, development needs, political access needs and identity needs 
(cultural and religious expression). (Azar in Ramsbotham et al, 2011, p.99) 
 
 
 
Governance and the state„s role are critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual 
and identity group needs. In stable and peaceful societies basic security needs are met by states 
and the respectable governments in contrast, the war torn societies are characterized by political 
and economic instability and deep rooted intergroup or class frictions. During this transformation 
period and in the environment of distrust societies are more vulnerable to human rights violations 
and relapse of violent conflicts in future. There are arguments that along with the military threats 
the nontraditional security threats, ranging from the economic to environmental and societal 
security, have the potential to escalate into conflict and war (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, 
p.115). With this regard social psychologists argue that to avoid conflict between individuals 
certain human needs should be satisfied. Hadley Cantril (cited in Schnabel and Carment, 2004, 
pp. 114-115) provides a universal conceptualization of human needs. 
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According to him at the very first point human requires the satisfaction of survival needs then 
wants both physical and psychological security. Humans are creatures of hope and continuously 
seek to enlarge the range and quality of satisfaction as well as to exercise the capacity to make 
choice. The most important features are the aspiration to experience their own identity and 
integrity and a sense of their own worthwhileness. In addition, humans seek a value and system 
of beliefs to commit with and a sense of confidence that their society holds a fair degree of hope 
about the fulfillment of their aspirations. 
 
 
Schnabel and Carment also refer to Maslow„s explanation of the „Hierarchy of needs‟ (2004, p. 
114) that after the satisfaction of basic security needs the sense of security accompanied with 
economic security and well-being and then will be eager to express their communal and political 
needs and eventually will demand to participate in social and political life. Thus, there are 
arguments that satisfaction of economic and social rights are more critical than the political and 
civil rights. 
 
However, from realistic perspective where state„s interest holds the supreme position, it may 
sound rhetorical that durable peace can be established through ensuring human security. The 
issue poses question that how pragmatic it is to achieve global security through the pursuit of 
security for individual human beings and then the survival and well-being of individuals should 
be the core reference points for governance at national, regional and international levels. 
(Schnabel and Carment, 2004, p.116, v.2) 
 
With this regard self-enlightened governments; strong opposition willing to fight bad 
governments nonviolent way and external pressure by states, regional organizations or the UN 
pressure can be recommended for governments to behave responsibly, but unfortunately they are 
costly and non-existent.  
 
However, to overcome the challenges Schnabel and Carment point a framework where it requires 
building international will, capacity and norms to protect the civilians in the armed conflict; 
strengthen capacity of international community to prevent or resolve conflict as well as building 
local indigenous capacity to manage conflict nonviolently. 
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In addition, to establish the norms of democracy and human rights need to improve the 
accountability and governance and building capacity to counter the transnational crime for public 
safety. (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, p.119, v.2) 
 
 
The synthesis of development, democracy, human rights and peace are widely recognized in 
recent days and this approach of good governance will allow people to determine their own 
priorities; safeguard and promote their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights; and 
provide a pluralist environment, within which they can live with one another in peace, with the 
freedom to develop in all ways (Peck, 1998, p.17). Peck also argues that one of the aims of 
prevention is to build human security through the development of a system of good governance 
(ibid). In addition, according to him to promote good governance, it is important to establish an 
agreed upon standard and norms. With this regard he points to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the declarations that have 
followed in their wake, offer the best available blueprint for good governance, specifying in great 
detail exactly how human security„„should be provided by governments (Peck, 1998, p.18). 
 
 
Thus, Peck assumes that strengthen the capacity of sates of providing human security through a 
process of socialization, assistance and problem solving could be one of the crucial component 
of prevention by international and regional organizations. 
 
 
Accordingly, different preventive instruments are functioning in different label however, there 
are arguments regarding its adoption and implementation. The following part will be an effort to 
assess the pragmatism of the theoretical idea of post war conflict prevention efforts. 
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2.5. Adoption and implementation of conflict prevention instruments 
 
 
 
The conflict prevention measures and involvement in post conflict preventive peacebuilding 
efforts includes a diversified instrument and activities. Examining the status and accomplishment 
of conflict prevention could delve into wide-ranging important issues and questions regarding the 
engagement to the process. There are ample of rhetoric regarding the necessity of conflict 
prevention, but serious attempts to give organizations the tools, procedures and means to put 
global and regional preventive systems into place are modest at best (Ramsbotham et.al, 2011, 
p.2). 
 
 
2.5.1. The role of actors for effective conflict prevention 
 
 
 
The lacking of „political will‟ of international actors considered as an obstacle to the success of 
the prevention processes. Lund points that the problem causes as political wills are directed 
towards too many different directions. Although, the diversity of preventive measures is source 
of vitality however, Lund argues that energies are highly dispersed and unfocused; it also suffers 
from an overload of problems on the agenda and a myriad of perspectives from which to view 
them‖ (Lund, 2003, p.3). Some reasons can be identified for the slow progression of 
comprehensive conflict prevention that: the conventional wisdom persists that the costs to be 
borne and risks to be run are too high and the interests at stake are often too low. 
 
In challenging this wisdom Jentleson shows that political will is not an insurmountable problem: 
political constraints do have a degree of malleability. Jentleson„s claim is pertinent to 
institutionalized approaches to conflict prevention. (Cited in Schnabel and Carment, 2011, p.4) 
The strategic significance of the effected country to the big powers is important to mobilize the 
political will. Moreover, huge financial and political constraints and policy blind spots still keep 
international actors from addressing many conflicts in a timely, adequately supplied and 
coordinated way. (Lund, 2003, p.13) 
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In addition, role of private actors are also concerning issue. The corporate sector„s and NGO„s 
participation in conflict prevention is fundamental and necessary however, yet their roles, 
responsibilities and limitations (especially of the corporate sector) are not well understood. 
Moreover, in the first instance prevention obviously relies on actors within the affected countries 
themselves. There is a growing recognition of the valuable collaborative role of governments and 
the civil society organizations in conflict prevention and post conflict peacebuilding settings. 
Generally civil society organizations play a crucial role at different stages of conflict as partner 
with government and inter-governmental organizations. However, the genre of the role not only 
depends on the nature and severity of the conflict but also the relation with the government is an 
important determinant. 
 
Some governments are developing policies on conflict prevention with active involvement with 
national and international CSOs who have been consulted on the contents and on how best to 
implement the new objectives (Barnes, 2007, p.5). Confidence building is crucial component to 
bring government and CSOs closer together and get them to cooperate. In 2006 the Secretary 
General in the UN progress report on the prevention of armed conflict urges that 
 
 
“I encourage new and existing organs of the United Nations, to deepen their engagement 
with civil society and with other actors that play important roles in conflict prevention. 
To this end, I urge Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue 
with civil society.” 
 
(Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/60/891, 2006, p. 29 cited in Barnes, 2007, p.9) 
 
 
Availability of fund also important factor, for instance ample resources, financial and otherwise, 
are available to deal with the fallout of conflicts: humanitarian aid, peace missions, 
reconstruction aid. But very little is available for the business of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding (Barnes, 2007, p.8). Regarding the challenges of post conflict intervention„s 
efficacy Peacebuilders often blame the chronic lack of sufficient resources that are typically 
forthcoming from the international community to address post-conflict situations. (Lund, 2003, 
p.13) 
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2.5.2. Adoption of the method of addressing root causes 
 
 
 
Addressing the root causes and grievances are widely accepted instruments of conflict 
prevention. Gurr (1993) in his work shows that when governments listen to grievances and act to 
address them, problems are ameliorated. Confirming this notion, Lake and Rothchild (1996) 
argue that prevention of ethnic conflict requires governments to reassure minority groups of their 
physical and cultural safety, as well as to accord them respect (Peak, 1998, p.40). Considering 
the causes of conflicts Peck outlined four solutions which government can use to address the 
concerns of their minority groups: Firstly, territorial reform to satisfy demands for greater 
autonomy and control, secondly, electoral reform to meet demands for greater access to political 
decision making, thirdly, balanced distributive policies to provide opportunities for 
disadvantaged groups to satisfy demands for greater economic rights, and finally, policies of 
cultural pluralism that allow groups to develop their own identity and that address demands for 
cultural rights. (Peck, 1998, p.46) 
 
 
However, there are arguments regarding the assessment of the causes of war. The question what 
caused the war‟ has stimulated much discussion among scholars. Suganami in his book „On the 
Causes of War‟ analyzes the causal explanation of war. According to Suganami the historian„s 
responsibility is not only to narrate the history or only to describe the origin of war but also to make 
explanation of causes. For instance, when we will get the answers to the question how did this 
particular war came about„ is essentially same to have the answer to the question of what caused the 
war„ and none of them requires answering the question under what sorts of circumstances have wars 
occurred more frequently. (Suganami, 1996, p.115)  
 
According to Suganami it needs to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant causes. Because the 
question what caused an event is not asked only with presuppositions rather with clear purpose to 
determine who or what is to blame for the occurrence and how it can be prevented? (Suganami, 1996, 
p.131). Suganami found the idea of explanation central to the notion of cause. According to 
Michael Scriven causation can be understood as a special case of explanation, it refers to the 
relation between explanatory factors (causes) and what they explain.  
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Explanation as narration can render the occurrence more intelligible by solving specific puzzles. 
In this circumstance reasonable information works as the explanatory factor to solve the specific 
puzzles and constitutes the cause. (Suganami, 1996, pp.134-138) To understand the causes 
intelligibly structured or argued narratives must be presented, so he makes an effort to explore 
the construction of historical narratives. With this regard Suganami refers to „genetic‟ or  
„culminatory‟ type history. This type takes the narrative form and explains the event at the end of 
the period by going back in time. This structural description gives the background information as 
a cross sectional „breather‟. In addition, it provides all the information on the circumstances of 
historical period, turning points, relevant mechanistic processes, moves of the actors and make us 
to understand the meandering which lead to the outbreak of war. Here in the concentration is 
given to depict the transition from peace to war in the relation of states in a given period not 
strictly to the outbreak of conflict. 
 
 
Thus, according to Suganami it is not necessary to know about wars in general to give an account 
of specific war and causal explanation of a particular event does not involve the covering law 
statement. Suganami‟s assessment of causation and his way of explanation might be preferable 
for examining a particular war. However, revealing the causes of war is not only confined to 
disclose them it also relates to find solution. His perception does not shed light to establish a 
structure of long term preventive measures of the war.  
 
It is important to assume the circumstances to measure the potentiality of future war. Though, 
this argument is more general standpoint which is to eliminate all war. In contrast, if we think of 
the possibility of degeneration of a particular war, it is more apposite to analyze the causes of 
that particular war and resolve them to eliminate the potentiality of relapse. On the other hand, as 
all the cases are not the same so it is not easy to generalize it on regularity based theory, but to 
develop a culture of prevention by strengthening the actors of implementation it needs to 
structuralize the whole program. To operate them it also needs the general hypothesis so it is also 
possible to develop a law based on statistic or quantitative research, for example in how many 
cases does natural resources caused war? What are the circumstances? Are they similar with the 
given events? Based on these questions we can assume the potentiality of war and take necessary 
steps. 
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2.5.3. Implementation of reconciliation process 
 
 
 
In order to sustain social cohesion there is always a general need for reconciliation between all 
societies. However, difficulty occurs when it deals with conflict prone societies. It is undeniable 
that the road to reconciliation is often long and tortuous. Nonetheless, question appears that when 
should it come into action? Few scholars insist that attempting reconciliation at the early stages 
are pointless and could be counter-productive as deeply traumatize individuals and groups are not 
ready for such an undertaking. This relates to the argument of „contact hypothesis‟ that, the more 
contact between conflict parties the more scope of resolution (Ramsbotham et al, 2011, p.248). In 
contrast, few scholar such as Kaufmann (1996, p.161) argues regarding the separation; „good fences 
make good neighbors‟. On the other hand Northrup (1989, p.80) argues that the most necessary 
thing is an eventual redefinition of self/other identity constructs themselves, so that a sense of 
„we‟ replaces the us/them split. 
 
 
Throughout the way of de-escalation of conflict have to go through four stages of reconciliation: 
ending violence, overcoming polarization, managing contradiction and celebrating difference. 
Political closure and acceptance are assumed as the preconditions for reconciliation.  
If the divisive political issues are still active and threatening it becomes harder to move forward 
with the deeper process of reconciliation. With this regard there are arguments that reconciliation 
is often easier after decisive defeat and victory: the losers may fell that they might reconcile 
themselves to the outcome as it is unavoidable, while the winners may find it possible to be 
magnanimous (Ramsbotham et al, 2011, p.258). Herein the problem is that, sometimes it is 
considered hard to forgive the defeated or victorious enemy as they are still seen to be an 
immediate and potent threat, so at the second stage it needs to overcome polarization. While 
dehumanized images of the enemy are still present and mutual convictions of victimization are 
widely believed deeper process of reconciliation cannot be reached. In this condition the other 
should be „rehumanized‟. At the third stage it requires to bridge the continuing deep differences 
by structural political and economic rearrangements as well as by strengthening psychological 
possibilities of living together peacefully despite persisting conflicts. Though there is little 
possibility of reparation in individual cases. However, situation can be strengthening through 
gradual improvement of political and economic opportunity.  
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Accordingly, when parents feel that things are likely to get better for their children then space for 
deeper reconciliation will be widened. Followed by some believe that a true reconciliation can be 
achieved when society enter to the realm of atonement and forgiveness. According to 
Ramsbotham in this stage enemies are reconciled to the point where differences are not only 
tolerated, but even appreciated.  
Sometimes there are formal acknowledgement and apology on behalf of previous generations 
and general acceptance that a shared future is more important than a divided past. In addition, it 
involves deeper level of peacemaking and cultural peacebuilding through revisions of formerly 
polarized official accounts and media representations, pluralization of education and stories told 
in school text books and eventually on to leavening everyday experiences that affect localized 
transmissions of memory within communities and families (Kelly, 2002, cited in Ramsbotham et 
al, 2011, p. 261). 
 
 
2.5.4. . International involvement in conflict prevention 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the post war conflict prevention brings about the question of international 
involvement and intervention, which shade light mainly on the liberal values. According to Lund 
in this pervasive world view, market-oriented economic reform, democratization, civil society 
building, human rights, rule of law, and good governance are assumed to be the most promising 
approach both to preventing intra-state and inter-state conflicts as well as to developing poor 
societies and organizing nations. In every component, whether economic reform or war crime 
tribunal liberalism encompasses the theory of peace and long-term conflict prevention (Lund, 
2003, p.15). However, there are arguments regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
intervention. The most important question is whether the activities of conflict prevention actually 
achieve the results that they seek in the countries in which they are carried out. Studies show that 
in some cases the peace efforts could be reverse; the danger of failed peace agreement for 
example Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, adverse effects of humanitarian aid urge to think 
about the efforts critically. 
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In addition, internationally-promoted majoritarian elections in highly divided societies in the 
interest of democracy can increase the risks of violent backlash by factions who see themselves 
losing (Reilly, 1999, p.B2). There are also growing concerns, about the half-hearted international 
intervention which are operated by determined oppressors as a go-ahead signal or tool to carry 
out more oppression with impunity. Still other concerns arise from the lack of rigidity in the 
strategies behind interventions and the lack of attention to whether results are really being 
obtained. (Lund, 2003, p.17) However, there are arguments about the challenges of efficacy and 
as the main problem refer to the chronic lack of sufficient resources forthcoming from the 
international community. Thus, in approaching the conflict the objective has been identified as 
„do not harm‟ by taking care in the changing vulnerable societies and „do some good‟ if possible, 
by deliberately and sensitively fostering peaceful and constructive political conflict and avoiding 
violent destructive expression of the inevitable clashes between interests during a period of 
strife. (Lund, 2003, p.18) 
 
Finally, for an effective preventive mechanism it needs institutionalization of the policies and 
strategies. For this to happen, along with incorporating the preventive policies into the 
government and organization„s agendas and programs it also requires to operationalize across a 
joint group of preventive actors (Ackerman, 2003, p. 6). However, Ackerman reveals problems 
that the member-states of various institutions often are skeptical as to the legality and viability of 
preventive action especially during the response to imminent crisis. In addition, the capacity to 
coordinate and conduct multilateral preventive action is another problem area. Decentralized 
approach or to shift preventive action to the regional organization level could be a possible 
solution as referred by Ackerman (ibid). Nonetheless, to assess the efficiency of preventive 
measures is complex which requires assessment of a large number of situations and conflicts, 
which further open up the debate among scholars. This urge question that which approach should 
be followed. With this regard Sriram & Wermester„s context-specific approach could be an 
option (cited in Wallensteen and Moller, 2003, p.7). Therefore, long-term approach could be a 
solution for an effective preventive mechanism. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Historical background and causes 
 
 
 
The history of bloody civil war of Sri Lanka is very important to be revealed, though it is 
difficult to be analyzed. To understand the dynamics of the conflict it needs to elucidate the 
puzzles of the ethnic conflict. This study begins with an effort to explore the causation of the war 
through explaining the history of it. 
 
 
To understand the causes intelligibly structured or argued narratives provides all the information 
on the circumstances of historical period, turning points, relevant mechanistic processes, moves 
of the actors and make us to understand the meandering which lead to the outbreak of war. 
 
 
In addition, at this particular stage of post war conflict prevention, addressing the root causes is 
matters of concern for develop the risk assessment and early warning system. Carment and 
Schnabel (2004, p.6, v.2) find this early warning and risk assessment not only about gathering 
facts, conducting diagnostics and developing predictive models but also relates to the 
anticipating and responding to specific events and preventing them from occurring. Therefore, to 
analyze the causes of the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka the history of the war will be explained. 
 
 
Sri Lanka, a traditionally multicultural, multi-lingual, multi ethnic and multi-faith island where 
four great world religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, a range of indigenous 
spirit beliefs, and astrology, have coexisted for centuries. 19 million people with diverse and 
often overlapping religious adherence. The linguistic majority Sinhalese who number 
approximately 74 percent of the population 69 percent of them are primarily Buddhist. The 
Tamil comprises approximately 18 percent of the population are largely Hindu minority. There is 
also Muslim minority (of Arab and Malay origins), which constitutes a significant portion, about 
eight percent of the population, at the same time the Eurasian – Christian Burghers – add up to a 
little under one percent of the population. (Senanayake, 2009, p.3)  
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Sinhala Buddhist hegemony reinforced the differentiation of ethnic categories along regional 
identities and this is a significant reason of the Tamil militants to have a strong geographical 
dimension. Of the ethnic and religious groups, the Sinhalese are predominate in all parts of the 
country except Northern and Eastern part. On the other hand the Tamil and Muslim community, 
which have shared common Tamil language, are spread throughout the island but mostly 
concentrated in the North and East provinces. More specifically, Tamil Hindus predominate in 
the Northern Province and maintain a significant presence in the Eastern Province. The Eastern 
Province is ethnically mixed area where Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese are found in significant 
numbers even though Tamils have a slightly higher statistical edge. Christians maintain a 
significant presence in the coastal areas. (World Bank, 2003, p.1) 
 
 
Historically there is also a dividing line through the Tamil community, wherein one side is 
known as Sri Lankan or indigenous Tamils who are also internally divided into Jaffna Tamils 
and Eastern or Batticaloa Tamils; constitute 12.6 percent of population. On the other side, the 
Indian Tamils whose ancestors came to the island from South India in nineteenth and first half of 
the twentieth century as tea and coffee plantation laborer. (Wickramasinghe, 2006, p.265) 
 
 
Despite the coexistence of the divergent ethnicity Sri Lanka has experienced world„s one of the 
most devastating protracted war. The self-sustaining and reproductive nature of the ethnic war 
raises question on how the conflict gained enduring momentum to reproduce itself, why the 
parties were not interested in settlement (Uyangada, 2007, p. 2). In exploring these questions this 
part will analyze the features and facts that repeatedly enforced and reproduced the ethnic 
conflict. In addition, to understand the reproductive dynamics, Jayadeva Uyangoda suggests the 
necessity to distinguish the ethnic conflict character from the ethnic war process. According to 
him „ethnic conflict may presuppose the possibility of bargainable compromises, Sri Lanka„s 
ethnic war is fought on non-negotiable preferences and options because it is propelled forward 
by two contradictory and mutually exclusive state formation agendas.‟ (Uyangada, 2007, p. viii). 
 
With this regard we can define Sri Lanka case as protracted ethnic war. 
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Historically, the sign of the conflict can be anticipated prior to independence. During the colonial 
period the island known as Cylon then, experienced the tensions and riots between the majority 
and minority ethno religious communities. The then Tamil political leaders were concerned 
regarding the inadequate protection of minorities from the potential discrimination caused by the 
unitary constitution dominated by the majoritarian Sinhalese rule and called for constitutional 
protection, for instance: fifty percent of parliamentary seats and cabinet posts reservation for 
minorities. However, having denial of that option federal constitutional structure and self-
determination become the key demand. (Nissan, 1998, p.10) Therefore, the question of state 
power, group discrimination, limited access to public resources and cultural marginalization and 
all these key components of the minority experiences gradually generated the ethnic conflict and 
the demand for autonomy. The root of the ethnic war and the obstacles to the way of successful 
negotiation is vast and complicated to be revealed and also sometimes overlapping. It cannot be 
considered apart from the ancient history to investigate the emergence of the religion and 
language based nationalism which afterward proposes the radical form of political interest. 
Therefore, to simplify the analysis history and causation are integrated into a single part and the 
causes are divided into different categories. 
 
 
3.1. Language as a source of conflict 
 
 
 
The rise of Tamil militancy has to be understood in the context of power relations and politics 
within Sri Lanka, which emerges mainly during the British colonial period. The local language, 
religion and culture were dominated by the English language, Christianity, and the culture of the 
British rulers (Orjuela et al, 2010, p.14). Local elite class (both Sinhala and Tamil communities) 
developed who adopted English language or Christian religion and continued to hold power after 
independence. However, the Tamils gained proportionally higher representation in the 
administration and professions than the Sinhalese because of the education which introduced by 
missionary schools many of which were established in the Tamil dominated Jaffna in the north 
(ibid). In the early 1944, politicians proposed resolutions in Parliament to declare Sinhalese the 
official language, whereas other amendments proposed both Sinhalese and Tamil as official 
languages.  
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A 1944 resolution specified that Sinhalese and Tamil would become the languages of instruction 
in schools, examinations for public services and legislative proceedings. The resolution was 
approved by 27 to 2 in the Sinhalese-dominated legislature. Advisory committees were 
established on how these changes were to be implemented; however, there was little progress. 
(World Bank, 2003, cited in Tamil Guardian) 
 
 
English remained the government language and the supremacy of English involved a 
supplementary arena of ethno-linguistic rivalry between Sinhalese and Tamils (Dharmadasa, 
1981, p2). Thus the vernacular speaking majority found little possibility of cultural and political 
transformation in the newly independent country (Nissan et al, 1998, p.11). The Sinhala speaking 
rural elites treated English and superior position possessor Tamil community as a major barrier 
to their advancement. These Sinhala rural elites mobilized Sinhala nationalism asserting close 
identification between Sinhala people, Buddhist religion and the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 
(ibid). These elite groups using those sentiments appeared as key political actors and defeated the 
United National Party (UNP) government in 1956 general election. S.W.R.D Bandaranaike 
leaded coalition government formed by Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and 
 
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People„s United Front-MEP). 
 
 
 
The newly elected government primarily steps forward in quest of redressing two key fronts: 
firstly remove the barriers created by the formal status of English and secondly rectify those 
opportunities for which the Tamils enjoyed unfair advantage. On July 1956 the government 
passed „The Official Language Act No. 33‟ which is also referred as „Sinhala Only‟ act. Under 
this legislation Sinhala become the sole official language (Nissan et al, 1998, p.12). This act 
deprived the Tamil speaker„s right to employment so this denial was protested by non-violent 
movement however; this caused several outbreaks of anti-Tamil violence for the first time. (ibid) 
In response to this language act Tamil political party „The Federal Party‟ (FP) proposed four 
main demands to the government. For instance: federal constitution; equality of status for the 
Tamil and Sinhala language; granting of citizenship to the Upcountry Tamils; and an immediate 
halt to government-sponsored Sinhalese resettlement in the traditional Tamil speaking areas. 
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(Nissan et al, 1998, p.12) Non-violent civil disobedience was threatened in the absence of 
necessary steps to meet those demands. As a consequence of eleven months long non-violent 
agitation the Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Federal Party leader Chelvanayakam agreed a 
pact approving those demands. However, in April 1958 Bandaranaike abrogated the pact. 
Similarly, in 1960 before the general election these two parties entered into an electoral pact but 
after winning an outright majority SLFP ignored the agreement. Moreover in 1961 Sinhala was 
instituted as the language of administration (ibid). Although, legislation providing for reasonable 
use of Tamil was passed in August 1958 which is known as „Tamil Language (Special 
Provisions) Act‟ No. 28 which offers that: 
 
 
Firstly, Tamil pupil in a Government school or an assisted school shall be entitled to be 
instructed through the medium of the Tamil language in accordance with such regulations under 
the Education Ordinance relating to the medium of instruction as are in force or may hereafter be 
brought into force. 
 
 
Secondly, in accordance with the provisions of the Ceylon University Ordinance, Tamil language 
shall be made a medium of instruction in such University for students who, prior to their admission 
to such University, have been educated through the medium of the Tamil language. 
 
 
Thirdly, A person educated through the medium of the Tamil language shall he entitled to be 
examined through such medium at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public 
Service, subject to the condition that, he shall require a sufficient knowledge of the official 
language of Ceylon or acquire such knowledge within a specified time after admission to the 
Public Service. Moreover, in the Northern and eastern provinces Tamil language can be used for 
administrative purposes and for communication in the office capacity. (Tamil Language (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1958 cited in Tamilnation.org) 
 
However, until 1966 the regulations for its implementation were not created, even after that was 
not implemented. Through the years this language issue mobilized the sentiment of 
discrimination and grievance for Tamil speakers. 
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Tamil politicians stepped up non-violent protest and civil disobedience campaign. However, 
those were provoked by counter civil disobedience by Buddhist monks and Sinhala activists, also 
sometimes met with security presence. 
 
 
In February 1961, the Federal Party launched the biggest campaign throughout the northeast. 
 
Parties „Tamil Arasu (state) postal service‟ issued own stamps through Jaffna district post offices 
and blocked the administrative buildings in Jaffna. They called on Tamil government employees 
not to study Sinhala as well as not to transact any business in Sinhala. In addition they asserted 
Tamil people correspond with government in Tamil only (Nissan et al, 1998, p.13). However, 
this time it ended up with a government declaration of state of emergency, deployment of troops 
to regain the control of this area. Moreover, the government closed the Tamil postal service and 
all the Federal Party MPs were detained for six months. (Nissan et al, 1998, p.13) 
 
 
This time in 1965 Federal Party went into an agreement with United National Party (UNP) 
known as Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact as a result Tamil language regulations published in 
1966. However, these could not meet the expectations of FP as well. 1970s is the turning point 
which experienced the transition of Tamil demands and tactics stronger from federalism and civil 
disobedience. These changes were made in response to the Republic Sri Lanka„s new 
constitution in 1972, inaugurated by the new United Front coalition government„s Prime 
Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, which entrenched Sinhala language and Buddhist ideology as in 
the foremost place. (Nissan et al, 1998, p.14) 
 
Under the 1978 constitution, the provisions of 1958 Tamil language legislation and the 1966 
Tamil language regulations were incorporated, which changed the status of Tamils. Moreover, 
after the Indo-Lanka Accord the 13
th
 constitutional amendment of 1987 made Tamil official 
language alongside Sinhala and English. Nevertheless, even today Tamil speakers remain at a 
considerable disadvantage in their dealing with state and in commercial and business life outside 
the northeast. Though, the Official Language commission had an effort but policies are not 
implemented. (Nissan et al, 1998, p.13) Thus the language issue mobilized the ethnic sentiment 
among Sinhalese and Tamils and sowed the seeds of conflict, which remained unresolved till 
now. 
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3.2. Religion as the source of ethnic division and conflict 
 
 
Religion is an important factor of ethnic division and conflict in Sri Lanka. In the 9
th
 or 12
th
 
century the external threat from South India is the emergence of the formulation of clear 
Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic and cultural identities. (World Bank, 2003, p.2) 
 
Though these wars were wars of dominance fought between regional rulers however, historical 
chronicles compiled by Sinhalese Buddhist monks defined these wars as campaigns undertaken 
to protect Buddhism and the Sinhalese nation. These were further reinforced by formal education 
and these problematic interpretations by many Sinhalese are accepted as fact today. Thus, 
interpretation of ancient history played crucial role to construct the nationalistic idea. The history 
and religious symbolic meaning got politicized by the nationalist scholars and government. 
 
 
In analyzing the identity factors the premordialists conceive the present internal conflict as one 
reproducing of fundamental antagonism that goes back to ancient times and is anchored in a 
collective memory transmitted in an uninterrupted fashion through language (Sinhala as opposed 
to Tamil) and religion (Teravada Buddhism as opposed to Hindu Saivism) (Wickramasinghe, 
2006, pp. xi-xii) 
 
Before the rise of states the island of Sri Lanka and South India have been part of single cultural 
region (Indrapala, 2005 in Fernando, 2008, p.118). According to Tambiah with the rise of states 
 
„galactic politics‟ developed in the region. Under this galactic politics dynastic conflicts took 
place. Though, this system was associated with a politics of expansion and plunder but, the 
effects of such politics began to shape both the religious and political historiography of the 
literati monks of the period, thus conditioning the system of religious symbolic meanings. The 
chronicle Mahavamsa considers „dhamma‟ as a lamp that gives light to the island. Mahavihara 
was a monastery of Theravada Buddhism. R.A.L.H Gunawardana reveals the contradictory 
evidence of Mahavamsa : Duttagamini is projected as the Sinhala Buddhist nation builder by the 
ethno-nationalist intellectuals fought against not just one principality in the north ruled by a 
Tamil, but thirty-two different other rulers within the island. 
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There, not all the people fought against Duttagamini were Tamils on the other hand; there were 
Buddhist among the Tamils. So there was no ideological connection between language and 
religion. (Fernando, 2008, pp.118-123) 
 
 
The author monks of the later vamsa tradition have created a stereotypical image of the Tamils 
making an essentialist connection between Sinhala and Buddhism. Based on the Asokan and 
Duttagamini paradigms of „two wheels of dhamma‟, where the sangha expected the dynasties to 
protect sasana. In writing down history, they made the Theravada tradition a sectarian anti-Tamil 
state ideology and expressed aspirations for a stronger Buddhist kingdom (Fernando, 2008, 
p.124) According to Reynolds a process of mythologization of history and historisization of 
myth have taken place in the interpretation. 
 
 
Dhammadipa which is the teaching of Buddha; the light of the mode of life, got changed the 
meaning that Sri Lanka has the Dhamma as a lamp. According to Michael Roberts the Sinhala 
people also believe that they were the chosen people for the island (Fernando, 2008, p.128) 
 
 
The territorialization of religion turned into Sinhalese Buddhist mainly during the colonial period 
through narratives. Jayadeva Uyangoda and Seneviratne show that the present model of Sri 
Lankan unitary nation-state is mainly a modern construction (colonial and post-colonial). For 
instances, Mahavamsa translated from Pali literature to English then Sinhala, where written that 
Sri Lanka is belong to Buddhists. There are arguments that due to geopolitical interest in Indian 
 
Ocean the British colonial power didn„t want to spread the uprising in the island and supported a 
unitary state system. According to Uyangoda, Sri Lanka enters the stage of formation of a state 
by the recycling of pre-existing myths mainly through the material conditions of colonialism 
within the British imperialist project. (Fernando, 2008, pp.128-130) 
 
 
Later after the independence this idea was mobilized by the Sinhalese educated rural people 
whose nationalist aspirations for cultural transformation, power and status did not automatically 
materialize with independence.  
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In 1951, resolutions of the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress included a statement to the prime 
minister that, the government is legally and morally bound to protect and maintain Buddhism 
and Buddhist institutions. Sri Lankan Buddhist strongly believes that they have duty to protect 
and uphold their faith in the country and tens and thousands of Buddhist monks‟ sacred vows to 
do so. If they voice concerns that their faith is under threat, that is extremely powerful and 
emotive message. (Liyanage, 1998, pp.65-66) Therefore, the politicization of religion is one of 
the root causes of the conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Education and ethnic conflict 
 
 
 
Inequality in the education sector reinforced the conflict. Since 1970, access to education, 
particularly to higher education, has been ethicized. Along with this different aspects of 
education for example, structural organization of schools and universities, contents of textbooks 
and training of teachers have influenced the ethnic conflict directly. Compared to other ethnic 
and religious groups in the country, Tamils have had strong cultural norms to value education. 
Many Tamils attended English language schools which were the passport to higher education 
and better employment in the colonial period. As a consequence of well-funded American 
missionary activities, the Tamil-dominated Northern Province had comparatively better facilities 
for English language and pre-university education. (World Bank, 2003, p.3) In the Tamil 
predominated areas the traditional land based occupation in the arid areas was limited, which 
encouraged many to seek employment through education. As a result there were over-
representation of Tamils in higher education, professions and the administration in comparison to 
their status in the general population. By independence, Tamils accounted for over 30% of 
government services admissions. By 1956, 50 % of the clerical personnel of the railway, postal 
and customs services, 60% of all doctors, engineers and lawyers, and 40% of other labor forces 
were constituted by Tamils. (World Bank, 2003) With this regard the Sinhalese took efforts to 
curb the Tamil presence and the „Sinhalese only Bill‟ was one attempt in this process. 
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The constitutional provisions in 1972 favoring the Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion, 
along with their educational policies, convinced many Tamils that they had been perceived as a 
marginal community. According to 1971 standardization policy for the university entrance exam, 
Tamil students had to score higher than Sinhalese speaking students to gain admission to 
universities. This was the first time; the ethnicity was used as a basis to tamper the integrity of 
university admission policy. (World Bank, 2003, p.3) 
 
 
In 1972, a district quota system was introduced in order to benefit those not having adequate 
access to educational facilities within each language. These changes had a serious impact on the 
demographic patterns of university entry. Though in 1977 the language based admission policy 
was abolished and various adjustments have introduced, still then many Tamil youth feel that 
they are discriminated in higher education access. 
 
In addition, the organizational structure of educational institution, the training of the teachers, the 
content of text books and syllabus are strong and long lasting elements for ethno-linguistic 
impact. Institutions, with more than one language of instruction, are affected by internal 
segregation. In real terms Sinhalese students are segregated into Sinhalese-language schools and 
Tamil and Tamil-speaking Muslim students are segregated into Tamil-language schools. If they 
enter universities or technical institutes, this segregation is likely to continue unless they opt to, 
and have the money to receive, a non-segregated further education in English in private 
institutions. (World Bank, 2003, p.5) 
 
 
Similarly, the teachers training system and institutions are also segregated except in the training 
of teachers specializing in subjects such as English. Recently the context of multi-cultural society 
has been taken into account regarding teachers training. Moreover, since 1980s the school text is 
playing important role in shaping ethnic relation in the country. School texts have been written, 
supervised, produced and distributed by agencies of the state, which reflects the state policy or 
thinking. Ethnic politics also have been played out of the process. However, recently the 
problematic contents have been removed by revision and rewriting process, but in some cases it 
is extreme that all references to ethnicity and related issues have been removed. 
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3.4. The issue of land and ethnic conflict 
 
 
 
Since independence land has been a highly politicized and ethicized issue in Sri Lanka, and an 
important factor that contributed to the conflict. In early 1960s state-sponsored colonization 
schemes, moving Sinhalese into Tamil and Muslim-dominated areas caused much concern at the 
time (MRG, 2011, p.19). The clearest site of politics of land and ethnicity has been in the 
sparsely populated areas of the dry zone in the North Central Province and the Eastern Province. 
The settlement of poor Sinhalese farmers from the densely populated wet zone areas of the 
country made a different perception among the Tamils. The notion of the traditional Tamil 
homeland became a potent component of popular Tamil political imagination. The colonization 
scheme had a significant impact on demographic pattern, particularly in the eastern province. 
The Sinhalese irrigation settlements in the North Central and Eastern Provinces under direct state 
sponsorship appeared to the Tamils as a deliberate attempt of the Sinhalese-dominated state to 
marginalize them further by decreasing their numbers in the area. (World Bank, 2003, p.5) 
 
 
In addition, in late 1970s „Acclerated Mahaweli Program‟ was taken to accelerate the 
development of dry zone for agriculture and resettle people. As a result of continuing agitation of 
Tamil people in 1986, the government agreed to allocate the remaining land on the basis of the 
ethnic distribution of each ethnic group in the total population. On the other hand, the Muslim 
community tended to reject the countervailing notion of a traditional Tamil homeland in the 
North East region. Growing cooperation between the security forces and Muslim home guards 
led to LTTE attacks on Muslim villages in the East, armed counter attacks on Tamil communities 
in the South East and to the eviction of 55,000 Muslims from the North in 1990 most of whom 
remain displaced today. (World Bank, 2003, p.5) 
 
 
3.5. Non-negotiability of state power devolution 
 
 
 
The question of political power sharing is one of the key causes of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Self determination and self government have been critical demands of minority groups for over 
half a century in Sri Lanka.  
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They were also central to the conflict and were the basis upon which Tamil nationalism and later 
Tamil militancy were founded. Since independence Sri Lankan governments have held different 
ideological positions and given different practical response to these demands. During the conflict 
the government attempted to discuss some form of political autonomy for minorities, mainly for 
Tamils. 
 
 
Since the 1930s, and much more clearly since the 1950s, Tamil political parties have been asking 
for greater political autonomy for the areas in which they predominate. The devolution of power 
has been recognized at different times as a means to diffuse tensions. A number of pacts had 
been formulated to define the modalities for devolution of power, including the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayagam Pact in July 1957 that offered a framework for regional devolution. But due to 
various political pressures, the provisions of the pact were never implemented. In 1965, the 
Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact was formulated and agreed upon but, were annulled. (World Bank, 
2003, p.6) The failure to implement these proposals led the Tamils to demand separation, instead 
of Federalism that they had been seeking up to that point. In 1977, the Tamil United Liberation 
Front won an overwhelming electoral victory on a highly charged political platform of 
separatism. In 1980, the District Development Council Act was passed in Parliament and 
elections to the councils were held in July 1981. But given the lack of government commitment 
to decentralization of power, this attempt also proved to be a failure. This resulted to the armed 
insurgencies. (ibid) 
 
According to Jayadeva Uyangoda the puzzle of Sri Lanka„s ethnic conflict and the difficulties in 
its termination are embedded in the non-negotiability of the vital question of state power. The 
fact that the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE continue to approach the possible negotiated 
solutions in minimalist (minimum devolution) and maximalist (confederal autonomy) 
perspective and through this strategic path the conflict dynamics can be defined. The peace 
negotiations, rather than resolve the issue, had been an occasion for the governments and the 
LTTE to discover new differences, explore new enmities, and reinforce existing antagonisms. 
There was a continuing gap between the desired peace and possible peace. While the 
contestation for state formation has provided a non-negotiable character to the conflict, it 
continues to supply the ethnic war with an enduring capacity for reproduction. Though there 
were several mediation, facilitation and negotiation efforts but they proved inadequate to resolve 
the issue. (Uyangoda, 2007, pp.vii-ix) 
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3.6. Human rights violation 
 
 
 
According to the Minority Rights Group (MRG) report, for at least last four decades Sri Lanka 
has had a poor human rights record. In early 1970s and late 1980s there were two major 
insurrections in the south, when tens of thousands of university students, academics, media 
personnel, activists and politicians were killed by military attacks while hundreds have been 
disappeared, arbitrarily arrested and detained, abducted and tortured on suspicion of involvement 
with the Tamil Tigers (MRG, 2011, p.25). In the last few years human right violation was 
targeted mainly on minorities. State organs like army and police conducted violation against the 
minorities. Between 2005 and 2009 there was a significant increase in disappearances and extra-
judicial killings, abductions, arrests and detentions under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism act). 
 
Since 1979 this PTA has been used as extensive power to arrest and detains individuals for up to 
18 months without trail. This PTI does not comply with international standards. In a joint report, 
the Civil Monitoring Commission, Free Media Movement and the Law and Society Trust, 
recorded 662 killings and 540 disappearances, in the period January–August 2007. (MRG, 2011, 
p.25) 
 
 
The LTTE also were responsible for large-scale human rights violations, attacks on civilians in 
places of religious worship and suicide bombings in Colombo as well as eviction of northern 
Muslims. LTTE also accused of the forceful recruitment of child and adult soldiers. The 
intolerance of political opposition led the LTTE to kill many moderate Tamil political leaders, 
journalists and activists. (MRG, 2011, p.25) Along with other issues this human rights violations 
also reinforce the conflict. 
 
 
3.7. Global power struggle and geopolitical importance of Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
During their colonial rule the British regarded the island of Ceylon as an important strategic post 
to maintain control over the sea routes and their Indian Raj. The militarily crucial deep sea 
harbor in Trincomalee was situated in the Tamil inhabited eastern part of the island.  
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Due to their geographical proximity, Ceylon and India enjoyed close and strong cultural and 
political ties. This connection was manifested through the existing relationship between the 
Tamils living in the island and the South Indian Tamil population, which is assumed as a 
threatening factor for the British objectives to develop the island into a strategic asset. In this 
context British colonial power took the policy of creating a unified structural entity with a unique 
identity to enhance geographical separation. (Permanent Peoples Tribunal, 2013, pp.11-12) 
 
The Sinhalese were the „chosen people‟ to achieve this important task. In 1833, the British 
created a unitary structure by forcibly amalgamating the traditional Tamil homelands with the 
Sinhala areas thus laying the basis for a Sinhala dominated unitary state system. Subsequently 
through their work in the fields of historiography, archaeology and anthropology the British 
constructed a new „Sinhala Buddhist Aryan‟ national identity which would see India as an 
„invader‟ and the Tamils as the „descendants of the invaders‟. (Permanent Peoples Tribunal, 
2013, p.12) Despite the repeated demands by the Tamils for constitutional safeguards that would 
preserve their collective rights as a nation, the British transferred the power to the Sinhala elite 
leaving the Tamils at the hands of the newly created Sinhala dominated state that regarded them 
as an alien threat.(ibid) 
 
 
After the Second World War, the USA replaced Britain as the dominant power in the region. In 
partnership with Britain the USA maintained and developed the commitment to support and 
fortify the unitary structure in the island. According to Permanent Peoples Tribunal, in 2002 
during the internationally backed peace process the USA with the assistance of the UK, 
deliberately took a series of calculated measures to alter the balance of power between the 
Sinhala State and the defacto Tamil administration and succeed in destroying the negotiations 
process. The tribunal points that, U.S. motive is to gain control over the island as a strategic asset 
in their global military power projection. (Permanent Peoples Tribunal, 2013, p.12) 
 
 
Therefore, all these socio-political factors created the background for devastating protracted 
ethnic war in Sri Lanka. Until early 1980s the conflict was primarily limited to the political arena 
where destruction of property and life was minimal. 
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After this period different sporadic cases of violence gradually gave way to institutionalization of 
political violence, which was widely used by both the government and the LTTE. LTTE initiated 
guerrilla war and bombing campaign on central government targets and began to capture 
territory in north and east. Government responded with killings and disappearances of Tamils. 
Though there has been several peace efforts and mediation program.  
 
However, rather than finding a solution the negotiation became a platform for the adversaries to 
re-discover and re-inventing mutual differences, suspicions, apprehensions and even hostilities. 
This reinforced the conflict. 2004 devastating tsunami even failed to create an environment of 
cooperation due to dispute over distribution of foreign aid. Conflict intensified through late 2006 
and continued throughout 2007; both sides suffered heavy casualties. Conventional battles were 
accompanied by continuing rights abuses from both sides, including political assassinations, 
abductions, and targeted attacks on civilians. 20,000 to 30,000 killed between 2006 and early 
2009, with government and particularly LTTE suffering heavy losses in battle and estimated 
5,000 civilians killed in crossfire and targeted attacks. According to media reports 20,000 
civilians were killed in the final stages of war. On May 18
th
 2009 government declared victory. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Assessment of preventive measures in post-war Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
This part of analyzing conflict prevention process is divided into two parts. The first part is 
devoted to examine the contemporary situation based on different scholarly researches, 
government reports and newspapers. The second part analyzes different actor„s role in Sri Lanka 
conflict prevention. The actors are divided into: firstly, government action; secondly, nation-state 
actors, and thirdly, non-state actors and organizations. 
 
 
Analyzing the conflict prevention measures in Sri Lanka is a bit complicated as the case 
represents a unique situation; ended up with the win of the government and absence of any 
agreement among the adversaries. It also takes a different approach than conflict prevention 
theory, as the current scheme of relapse prevention is modeled on a situation where the parties 
are jointly agreed to ceasefire or peace agreement and the assumption of a negotiated settlement 
serves as the basis for direct and structural prevention. The agreement is seen as a signal of the 
parties‟ willingness to move towards a peace which involves the recognition of the other side as 
a legitimate actor. (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.23) The circumstances of total defeat of the 
LTTE encompasses that there is no apparent „other side‟ with which to reconcile and negotiate a 
post-war future. The dominant discourse of the Sri Lankan government after the war seemingly 
that the conflict is now solved and that hence there is no need for reconciliation.( Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2011, p.24) On the other hand, there are theoretical arguments that war ends with the 
win of one party brings the peace are more durable than the negotiated one. Accordingly, it  
requires testing the Sri Lankan model of peace and sustainability. 
 
 
Höglund and Orjuela (2011, p.20) reveal that the brutality of the war, the centralized and 
Sinhalese-dominated political system, and the Sri Lankan government„s lack of interest in 
political reforms for power sharing and minority rights suggest that the 2009 victory has failed 
not only to address many of the problems underlying the conflict, but also aggravated some of 
them. This refers to the affirmation of negative peace in Sri Lanka. 
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This part now turns into an analysis of the conflict prevention measures in Sri Lanka. Assessing 
the conflict-prevention literature Höglund and Orjuela points four major areas which should be 
focused in a post conflict context to avoid relapse: 
 
 
4.1. Demilitarization or militarization 
 
 
 
Referring to Spear (2002) Höglund and Orjuela point that the conflict prevention paradigm 
emphasizes demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former combatants (DDR) as 
critical steps in relapse prevention as former combatants may pose a potential security challenge 
of renewal of conflict (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.26). Therefore, to establish sustainable 
peace security sector reform and demilitarization are recognized as indispensable. 
 
 
However, the Sri Lankan context presents a different perspective. The years long civil war 
evolved as a highly militarized society throughout the country especially north and east of Sri 
Lanka and in Colombo. The last years of the conflict resulted in unprecedented levels of 
militarization for instances, over a two-year period the government expenditure among other 
things, over security forces increased 40 percent (Jane„s Intelligence Review, 2009, cited in 
Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.26). After the end of the war in the government„s first post-war 
budget proposal, the defense allocation 15 percent increased compared with the year before 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p, 26). According to minority rights group the level of military 
presence and influence in the former war-torn areas are exceptionally high. New permanent 
military bases are being set up in areas previously held by the LTTE in the north and east (ibid). 
In the Jaffna peninsula there are 40,000 army officers and the ratio is approximately 1:11 of 
military personnel to civilians which is 1:3or 4 in Vanni. On nearly every major road there are 
military checkpoints (MRG, 2011, p.12). 
 
According to Höglund and Orjuela civilian control over the military is the prerequisite to prevent 
conflict at the same time separation between military and civilian functions is recommended. 
However, the Sri Lankan context contrasts with the idea. Along with the military presence the 
political area and civilian authority also has nearly been replaced by military authority.  
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Key civilian administrative positions have been bestowed to retired military personnel. In the 
absence of an elected provincial council, the north is governed by Colombo through the 
appointed provincial governor including Major General G.A. Chandrasiri (Governor of the 
Northern Province) and Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrama (Governor of the Eastern Province) 
(Crisis group, 2012, p.15). Similarly, the top district level civil authority „the government agents‟ 
are also occupied by military personnel in Tricomalee district. In addition, local-government-
level civil positions such as the Grama Seveka Niladari (villageheads), District Secretary and 
Urban Authorities now have little control over everyday decisions, which are largely determined 
by the military. (MRG, 2011, p.12) 
 
 
Moreover, the entry of former General Sarath Fonseka into the Presidential election campaign in 
late 2009 was indicative as he was in command of the Sri Lankan Army in the defeat of the 
LTTE and went straight to political campaigning from military without any civilian experience 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.27). This generated a fear of obscurity between military and 
civilian government. However, Fonseka was defeated in the election and was arrested and 
imprisoned due to the corruption of military equipment purchasing. Although, this was not an 
effort to impede the military uprising rather the military tribunal was used by the president to 
remove the political opponent. (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p, 26) 
 
 
The military has gained an important role in the Sri Lankan society. There were jubilant 
celebrations of the military heroes in the aftermath of the war. Moreover, the victory has been 
celebrated annually by the government on 18
th
 May. Posters and popular media also representing 
militarization for example, the society magazine „Hi!!‟ issued a ten-page cover story to salute the 
war heroes (the Sri Lankan military forces) with the front covered with a heavily armed special 
forces commander resembling an action film character (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p, 27). This 
trend defined as anomalous by Höglund and Orjuela in the context with need of demilitarize and 
reconcile. 
 
 
62
The development policy and decision making also has been bestowed to the military. Although, 
the Tamil civil administration is nominally in charge of decisions on reconstruction, land and 
resettlement in the north, the almost entirely Sinhala military has enormous powers to interfere 
with and in most cases directly determine policies on issues it considers important (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, p, 15). The military„s influential role over northern development policy – 
through the Presidential Task Force on Resettlement, Reconstruction and Security in the 
Northern Province (PTF) and at the district level – has resulted to the marginalization of the 
largely Tamil civil administration and led to ineffective and ethnically biased rebuilding. The 
senior military leaders are at the apex of the task force, the project and agency approval are 
operated by ex-military personnel and the power to approve beneficiary lists for humanitarian 
projects are given to the local area commanders, which has become as a tool to control the local 
people. Donors and humanitarian organizations fear that the process of approving the beneficiary 
lists could deny benefits to particular individuals or categories of individuals. Correspondingly, 
NGOs and development agencies also require inviting the local commanders for consultations, 
openings and projecting disbursement events. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.15) The 
government officials are also instructed to inform and involve the military in all their activities. 
The minority Rights Group report reveals that the villages in Vanni, no civil activity can take 
place without military scrutiny and permission. Any movement of people in or out of the area 
also requires military permission. 
 
 
Military commanders consider the resettlement and land issues with great importance and 
directly take over decision-making power regarding this. As field study of Crisis Group shows 
that in Mullaitivu a brigade commander told people not to go to their land and he will arrange to 
give them land for cultivation in the interior and for them to give up their land in the border area 
(Crisis Group, 2012, p.16). Regarding the resettlement of the displaced people the army denied 
the demand of getting back to their own villages for instance, many people were resettled in 
newly constructed village in Kombavil. Accordingly, there has also been huge influence on 
government officials UN and NGO„s activities. With this regard in October 2011 UN drafted 
new guideline to limit the extents of cooperation and communications between humanitarian 
agencies and Sri Lankan military authorities. 
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According to the guidelines the UN agencies and partner NGOs and INGOs will abstain from 
providing any kind of information regarding beneficiaries of programs and projects, and 
cooperating with military monitoring of humanitarian program. Any kind of civilian nature or 
humanitarian meeting undertaken by military personnel will be abandoned as well as forgoing 
themselves of utilizing military assets to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, these 
guidelines failed to make any changes. Crisis Group denominates the coordination of UN, 
INGOs and NGOs as erratic. (International Crisis group, 2012, p.16) 
 
 
Building military camps throughout the Northern Province has become a strategy of land seizure 
which causes new displacement. This policy has been justified by the government to prevent the 
future armed uprising. A comprehensive security complex consisting of major base camps linked 
to a system of detachments and satellite camps. These include large cantonments, some of which 
feature Chinese-built housing that is distinct from typical military-style barracks. There are 
believes that those are made to house military families. (International Crisis group, 2012, p.17) 
Along with these the military intelligence units and checkpoints increased in a large number 
across the Northern Province. Vanni is an ideal example of this, where there are frequent no -go 
areas scattered throughout the area. The largest cantonment has been built in Kilinochchi-
Iranamadu, the centre of Vanni, around the former LTTE camps. This required displacing a 
numerous families from their houses and land. Similarly, village Santapuram also planned to 
include which caused 100 returnee families from Menik Farm internment to stay months in a 
school building. However, strong resistance from the families and local governments garnered 
international publicity as a result 80 per cent of the village was released for resettlement. Besides 
this the remaining families were promised for temporary shelter, water and sanitation. However, 
these didn„t meet the reality. This refusal made the families to live in the broken or damaged 
structures while seeing their well-built houses across the perimeter fence being used by military. 
(International Crisis group, 2012, p.18) 
 
 
People in the south western border also experience the displacement for military occupation of 
several acres of land along the A9 road as buffer zone. In Murigandi village over 115 returnee 
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families are refused to get back to their home, they have been living there since 1970s. In 
addition, military restriction over fishing in the Iranamadulake to half the area affects the 
livelihoods of 100 families dependent on it. There has always been a sentry watching over the 
marked boundary on the lake. Although, the Sinhala fishermen are allowed to fish during nights 
but the Tamils can fish only the day time. (International Crisis group, 2012, p.18) Interview 
taken by the crisis group reveals that since mid 2011 the situation has improved a little. The 
similar refusal and relocation can be seen in Mullaitivu district. In Kaeppapulavu, 
Kokkuthuduvai, Maritimepattu which are mainly the site of the last stages of war, returnee 
families are denied to get back their lands for living or cultivation, instead Sinhala settlement as 
well as military bases in these lands raise anxieties and a fear of permanent displacement 
(International Crisis group, 2012, p.19). 
 
 
Research operated by Crisis group reveals that across the Vanni several hundred acres of lands 
are belong to the government, military and few are owned by private individuals. The villagers to 
whom the lands belong to are refused to return home due to the presence of land mines. Though, 
these lands are used by the militaries for their cultivation. Moreover, private lands are also taken 
by the military which formerly been occupied by LTTE. Rather than restore the properties to the 
original owners the armies making this rightful that the property captured from the guerrillas are 
belong to them. According to the government officials interviewed, the army is planning to 
occupy more lands for cultivation or agricultural purpose. Besides this land seizure the military 
farming and their supply of agricultural product to the market in a lower price also creates 
problems for local farmers as they don„t have any government support or subsidy for agriculture 
like the army gets. Along with the agricultural activities the military also involved in other 
economic activities for instance, army-run restaurants and shops along the A9 highway, as well 
as army trading posts scattered throughout the province. Tourist markets are also been captured 
by the army by establishing a number of hotels and guesthouses in the north. Air force has 
expanded flights by its commercial wing and now serves Jaffna, Kilinochchi,Vavuniya and 
locations in the east. The navy, for its part,is reported to manage its own ferry services. Adding 
to this, the army declared the formation of a private construction company to handle 
development contracts in the north. (International Crisis group, 2012, pp.20-23). 
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Another important condition of demilitarization for prevention is the treatment or disposition of 
suspected LTTE cadres. This has always been a matter of concern. According to Hoglund and 
Orjuela in the last phase of the war, the government either killed or captured the LTTE 
leadership and the military structures were destroyed or dismantled. Further, the LTTE Diaspora 
leadership was weakened by arresting the top overseas leader in August 2009. In addition, 
around 11,000 are suspected tie with LTTE were held in extra-legal detention centers. Human 
rights organizations criticize the process because of its lack of legal process and registration. 
Even the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) didn„t have any access to the detained 
LTTE suspects (International Crisis Group, 2010a; also Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
 
 
In May 2010 the government announced to release over 2000 ex-LTTE cadres including children 
after rehabilitation for instance, vocational training, opportunities to complete their basic 
education or garment industry employment and ceremonies have marked the return. In 2009 a 
DDR program launched to disarm and demobilize Tamil political party TMVP. The party was 
formed by the former LTTE commander Karuna who splintered from the LTTE in 2004 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.27). However, the party failed to secure any seats in the 
parliamentary election. Höglund and Orjuela point that the DDR process could not find success 
in building trust among the former adversaries in either of LTTE or the TMVP case. Instead, the 
treatment and detention of the suspected LTTE cadres could be a new source of grievances to 
those Tamil people who saw the LTTE as the leader for self-determination struggle (Höglund 
and Orjuela, 2013, p.27). 
 
 
4.2. Political reform and transformation 
 
 
 
Another important element of conflict prevention paradigm is political transformation, inclusion 
of former political opponents in the political process, and further democratization to address the 
root causes of the conflict (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.28). Some countries use the wake of a 
war ending as the opportunity to reform the constitution (ibid). However, Höglund and Orjuela 
describe Sri Lankan post-war situation as a series of missed opportunities regarding this political 
reform.  
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According to International Crisis Group assessment, the end of the war through the elimination 
of separatist Tamil Tigers (LTTE) made many people to expect an open space for greater 
political debate and moderation among Tamils as well as the government will abandon the hard-
line Sinhalese nationalism and agree to devolve meaningful power to the majority Tamil 
speaking northern and eastern province. However, the government failed in response to Tamil„s 
democratic and moderate voices. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. i) According to Höglund 
and Orjuela (2013, p. 29) in Sri Lanka in the political arena the prevention of relapse to conflict 
is done through political dominance of the majority and the future centralization of the state, as 
well as continuous policy of repression to silence and weaken the political opponents, civil 
society and media actors.  
 
The question of political power sharing has been one of the major sources of grievances of 
Tamils. Because of a strong centralized state system it is impossible for the Tamils to have 
meaningful control over land or economic policies in the areas where they are the majority. The 
abrogation of the Tamil„s autonomy agreement of 1957 and 1965 followed by the constitutional 
reform of 1972 and 1978 centralized the power and defined Sri Lanka as a unitary state. There 
was no opportunity of Tamil involvement in the politics. Conditions remain same even after the 
end of the war. The President has consolidated political power in a series of provincial elections 
as well as in the Presidential and parliamentary elections in January and April 2010. Höglund 
and Orjuela suggest that this consolidation of power could have been used to carry through with 
the reforms of the state structures in favor of devolution of power and decentralization of the 
state, which have been on the political agenda as a solution to the conflict for decades (Höglund 
and Orjuela, 2013, p. 29). 
  
With this regard, important constitutional amendments also lacks of political will to implement. 
For instance, the 17th amendment, aimed at depoliticizing the institutions such as Police and 
Election Commission, has remained unimplemented due to an unwillingness of successive 
power-holders to restrain their own power (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p. 29). Similarly, the 
13th amendment is the first constitutional arrangement to devolve power. In 1987 under intense 
Indian pressure the amendment passed which suggested establishing provincial councils through 
which Tamils were to be granted limited powers of self-rule in a merged north-eastern province. 
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However, the system was made for a strong centralized unitary state and offers the most fragile 
delegation of powers, with multiple avenues by which the president and parliament can take back 
these powers and obstruct the provincial councils. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.4) The 
centralization further strengthens by 18
th
 constitutional amendment in September 2010, which 
repealed the 17
th
amendment and allowed for a re-election of the president for more than two 
terms. The „thirteenth minus‟ government policy in the post war situation poses challenges to 
Tamil parties (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.4).  
Nevertheless, there are also arguments regarding the adequacy of thirteenth amendment for 
devolution. It has been rejected by the Tamil nationalists on the grounds that it is locked into a 
unitary and centralized state, so can offer no legal recognition of or power to the Tamil nation or 
Tamil speakers (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.18). 
 
 
On the other hand, from Tamil part the political circumstances also got detriment severely for 
instances, the LTTE„s violent struggle were its sustained attack on democratic Tamil political 
parties. The aggressive action caused a major damage to the basic structure of Tamil civil society 
and its traditions of political organization. However, the defeat of the LTTE generates hope for 
positive change and Tamil National Alliance (TNA) is playing a leading role here. The party 
founded in 2001 with the LTTE„s encouragement which was ambiguous as it didn„t has any real 
autonomy and no right to dissent but used by the LTTE to claim popular support. Nonetheless, in 
the post war context TNA„s action assumed as advancement towards devolution. Despite 
immense pressure from the government including physical attacks on candidates and other 
obstruction, the TNA has won all three elections it has contested: the April 2010parliamentary 
elections, the local authorities elections held throughout 2011 and the September 2012 eastern 
provincial elections as well as 2013 northern provincial election. (International Crisis Group, 
2012, p.7) 
 
 However, there was a wide range of suspicion regarding the participation of TNA in the 
northern provincial election and the positive outcome. For instance, „British Tamil Forum‟ (BTF) 
the UK based Diaspora organization questioned TNA„s decision of going for the election. 
According to the forum neither the acceptance of the thirteenth amendment nor the election can 
fulfill the legitimate aspiration of Tamil people or resolve the root causes. 
 
 
                                                                                         68 
 
 
Moreover, the decision of participating can poses significant risk for the future. (BTF, 2013, 
August 4) The forum also urges accountability of TNA towards the grievances and aspirations of 
Tamils for instance, right to self determination in the north and east; independent inquire of 
crimes committed against the Tamils; call for international and national action against grabbing 
of Tamil land; and a campaign to establish an interim administrative mechanism in the North and 
East to facilitate relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction for the benefit of Tamil war victims, 
with the direct participation of homeland Tamils, Tamils living abroad and the international 
community (BTF, 2013, August 4). 
 
 
Accordingly, the election manifesto of TNA shed light on the Tamil demand of power sharing on 
the basis of Federal structure and devolution of power over land, law and other socio-economic 
sectors including an acceptable manner for Tamil speaking Muslims. In addition, address the 
immediate concerns such as de-militarization, resettlement of displaced people, amnesty to the 
political prisoner detained without charge, independent international investigation of crimes 
against Tamils, comprehensive development program are also took significant place in the 
election manifest of TNA. (Colombo Telegraph, 2013) 
 
 
The head of TNA Sampanthan repeatedly stated the goal as to address both the immediate needs 
of war-affected population and too negotiate a political settlement within the framework of a 
united and undivided country that will enable the Tamil people to live in security and dignity, 
fulfilling their legitimate political, economic, social and cultural aspiration (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p.8). 
 
 
After the election five resolutions were proposed by the council member Hon M.K. 
Shivajilingam and adopted by the Northern Provincial Council in Sri Lanka on April 28, 2014. 
The resolutions are shading light on seeking justice under international norms; thanking the 
countries that supported the UNHRC Resolution during the March 2014 session calling for 
international investigation in Sri Lanka; Seeking assistance from the International Community to 
permanently resolve the Tamil national ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka; showing disappointment on 
banning of the Tamil Diaspora Organizations and individuals as it is an anti-democratic action by 
the Sri Lankan government (Northern Provincial Council, 2014, pp.1-2). 
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However, the response from the government is not satisfactory to the devolution. A proposal by 
the government to ban ethnically based political parties (parties with ethnic or religious labels in 
the party name) in 2009 was seen as a further sign of the government‟s strive to consolidate 
power for the Sinhalese majority at the expense of the minorities (Perera, 2009b). However, the 
proposal was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.12) 
 
 
Since the end of the war Rajapaksa administration had repeatedly broke promises to Tamil 
leaders and to the international community including India and the U.S.A and displayed little 
interest in reaching agreement. It also refused to formulate and present to the TNA or the public 
its own proposals for the devolution of power. There have been several rounds of negotiations 
between TNA and government also broke up without any positive outcome. (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p.9) 
 
 
Moreover, in October 2012 the government tried to repeal the thirteenth amendment through a 
new nineteenth amendment to replace the provincial council system and weaken the provincial 
power. Despite the governments unwillingness to devolution the TNA leaders have taken a 
number of other decisions designed to show moderation and willingness to compromise. 
According to International Crisis Group assessment, the government policy in the north-eastern 
part and delaying tactics in negotiations have denied the TNA any tangible benefits from its 
moderation and engagement strategy. This could conceivably lead to the eventual fracturing of 
the party and a greater role for more radical, possibly separatist groups in setting the direction of 
Tamil politics (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.13) 
 
The core of the Tamil nationalists demands are the recognition of Tamil nation and its right to 
self determination in a merged north and east. According to the civil society groups self-
determination does not necessarily require a separate state. It does require, however, a clear 
statement that Tamils are not a minority deserving equal rights‖, but rather a nation deserving a 
measure of self-governance. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.14) In response to this demand, 
as the representative of Tamil people, TNA constructs its agenda to step forward towards the 
claim of self determination within a united Sri Lanka as the only realistic temporary solution. 
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The victory of Maithripala Sirisena has created optimism for a positive change. Sri Lanka„s new 
president, Maithripala Sirisena, has promised to break from the Rajapaksa regime's rule with a 
100 day plan of widely welcomed reforms, which will ensure good governance, rule of law and 
judicial independence (Tamil Guardian 23 January 2015 and Colombo Telegraph, 2015). 
 
 
Ultimately, for establishing sustainable peace Sri Lankan government need to address the issues 
of identity and recognition of the Tamils as in equal status to Sinhalese, with the right to rule 
their own affairs and enjoy the respect and protection that only comes with having a territory in 
which the community is a majority. Thus, it is essential for the government and its international 
partners China, Russia, India, the USA, the EU, Australia, and Japan to recognize the importance 
of government willingness to share power. Governments refusal to power devolution in the north 
and east where Tamils and Muslims have for centuries been the majority, maximalist, even 
separatist, demands are likely to be attractive to large numbers of Tamils in Sri Lanka, as well as 
in the Diaspora. This could lead for continued ethnic polarization and political volatility and 
ultimately makes a potential for renewal of conflict. (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.32) 
 
 
4.3. Justice and Reconciliation 
 
 
 
In the Post war conflict prevention literature there is a general agreement, to establish sustainable 
peace, on the need of addressing past atrocities and restoring relations between groups divided 
by the conflict. However, there are arguments regarding the procedure to do this for instances in 
South Africa atrocities have been dealt with through truth-telling and amnesty or in Rwanda 
through bringing perpetrators to trial. On the other hand, post war reconciliation emphasis on 
dialogue and interaction between people from different sides of a conflict divide. 
 
 
With this regard, in Sri Lanka there has been a culture of impunity deeply engrained in society 
throughout the years of armed conflict. Perpetrators of violence against civilians and other war 
crimes have rarely been prosecuted. Almost all alleged crimes during the over 20-year-long civil 
war have gone unpunished. The escalating violence and the many war crimes have served to 
deepen the grievances held by all ethnic groups in the conflict. Failures to hold perpetrators 
accountable have led to lowered restrains and a worsening of abuses (Höglund and Orjuela, 
2013, p.30). 
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The end of the war could be a great opportunity to end the impunity and rebuild trust in the 
judicial system and across the ethnic divide. However, in Sri Lanka the situation is different. 
There has been strong resistance against any investigations into alleged war crimes. There are 
ample evidences of civilian death in the last part of the war though, the government refused it.  
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.30) Tamils caught up in the last stages of fighting who were 
interviewed for MRG report rejected government claims that civilians were not targeted. Those 
interviewed for the MRG report gave detailed accounts of witnessing dozens of people being 
killed on daily basis. They witness entire families died due to the shelling of their bunkers. They 
gave accounts that they saw dead bodies strewn all over the roads while escaping into military 
custody. One woman said she had to cross a water bunt to get to the government-controlled 
areas, and all along she could feel she was stepping on dead bodies. In a majority of these cases 
the people interviewed insisted that those killed were civilians, not rebels. Everyone interviewed 
for this report who was caught up in the last stages of the conflict were targets of military 
shelling and had lost a family member. (MRG, 2011, p.15) A Tamil woman from Kilinochchi 
said: 
 
“Of course they were targeting civilians. If they wanted to kill the rebels, they were in the 
frontlines fighting. They did not need to launch long-distance artillery and shells. It was 
only civilians who were in the core areas, who were targeted by this shelling, while the 
Tigers were in the periphery fighting the army.”(MRG, 2011, p.16) 
 
 
One of the earliest allegations of war crime came after UK„s Channel 4 news aired footage of Sri 
Lankan army personnel executing a Tamil-speaking civilian, which was reportedly filmed in the 
last stages of the war. A government appointed specialist group found the video to be fabricated 
however, the UN special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary execution, Philip 
Alston, in 2010 said that an expert group he had appointed to investigate found the footage 
authentic. In response to international pressure of independent and impartial investigation in 
2010 the UN Secretary-General appointed a three-member committee to look into the human 
rights abuses (MRG, 2011, p.16) 
 
There have been several calls by the UN and international human rights organizations for 
thorough investigations and prosecution of perpetrators however, so far not led to any substantial 
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outcomes. Instead, UN Human Rights Council meeting in May 2009 congratulated Sri Lanka for 
its victory over the LTTE, rather than condemning its blatant human rights violations, illustrates 
the inability of the international community to act. Moreover, Countries such as China and 
Russia have repeatedly supported the Sri Lankan government, blocking any international action 
against Sri Lankan war crimes. (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.30) 
 
 
Within the country there has been very limited discussion and debate and rarely have any space 
to do it in an open and acceptable manner. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the establishment of 
an international independent investigation, the Sri Lankan government appointed a domestic 
eight member „Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission‟ (LLRC) to investigate events in 
the period February 2002 to May 2009. The commission started its hearing in August 2010. The 
focus was to a large extent on criticism of the 2002 peace process and the former government 
that initiated it, while the hearings of Tamil victims in the former war zone received less 
prominence. The commission has been criticized by the human rights organizations for failing to 
meet basic international standards for independent and impartial inquire. This deemed the 
possibility of any serious investigations into government atrocities during the war (Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2013, p. 30). Key international human rights organizations invited to give testimony 
decided not to participate, similarly some senior civil society activists decided to boycott the 
commission. However, some other civil society groups and activists have used the commission 
to draw attention to human rights violations, including those affecting minorities. Many Tamil 
individuals and families have also made submissions to the commission, which has helped bring 
to light some of the atrocities committed in the last stages of the conflict, and some that are 
ongoing, such as disappearances and the detention of suspected LTTE members.(MRG, 2011, 
p.16) 
 
 
The Permanent Peoples‟ Tribunal (PPT: international opinion tribunal, independent from state 
authority) took initiative to investigate Sri Lankan war crimes in 2010 in the „Dublin tribunal‟ 
and in 2013 the „Bremen tribunal‟. The Dublin tribunal, looking at the documentation of 149 
massacres starting from June 1956 (Inginiyagala massacre) to June 2008 (Puthukuddiyrippu 
bombing) in which total 10,617 people were killed, as well as considering the atrocities in the 
final stage of the war, assume that the government of Sri Lanka is responsible for the crime.  
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In addition, the Bremen tribunal pursue the oppression and killing as a continuous process of 
genocide. According to the tribunal causing serious bodily and mental harm to the members of 
the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part are the continuity of genocide through the ongoing acts 
of genocide. (PPT, 2013, pp. 6-26) However, these initiatives of tribunals have been considered 
as too one-sided to be taken seriously, as it unilaterally condemned Sri Lanka and disregarded 
LTTE crimes. 
 
 
The issue of war crime and protracted violence has created a rift in Sri Lankan society clearly 
visible in the aftermath of conflict where large sections of the Sinhalese population celebrated 
the victory, while large parts of the Tamil population mourned their dead and worried about the 
future. With the victory of Maithripala Sirisena there has been a hope of accountability and 
justice. However, president Sirisena made it clear during his election campaign and in his 
manifesto that he would not allow any Sri Lankan citizen who fought against the LTTE to be 
handed over to face international justice. Instead, vowing to clean up Sri Lanka's image on the 
international stage, Sirisena promised a domestic inquiry into any allegations of war crimes. 
(Tamil Guardian, 2015) 
 
 
Regarding the local level process of justice and accountability there are mixed views. Some 
activists felt that people are not ready for that yet and for some process should begin slowly on 
the other hand, government„s opposition to such issues being raised would mean that people 
involved in the process could be at risk. Answering on the same issue some Tamil people 
showed anger over the LTTE„s attack on civilians and for forcible recruitment in the later stages 
(MRG, 2011, p.16). Activist interviewed by MRG explains various reasons for incapability of 
demanding justice at this point: firstly, there has been a fear among people that discuss and act 
on the issue could affect and target their remaining family members being - arrested or killed. 
Secondly, there is no civil space to hold conversations on these issues or to organize public 
meetings as any kind of assembly requires military permission and also the matter could be 
discussed with military (MRG, 2011, p.17). There is also a need for justice and accountability for 
those who suffered through the war. These issues are of crucial importance to minorities in terms 
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of reconciling their suffering and to bridge the gap between the majority and minority 
communities (MRG, 2011, p.17) 
 
 
A number of UN organizations, international NGOs and local civil society groups are engaged in 
activities that aim to provide space for dialogue and collaboration across the ethnic divide. 
However, these are often donor-driven initiatives that are not given publicity and recognition in 
official discourse, and which have a limited outreach (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p.31. There 
are also some dialogue attempts initiated by Sinhala nationalist organizations or even the Sri 
Lankan armed forces, with an aim to reach out to the Tamil victims of war and build a unified Sri 
Lanka. Here the problem is that the reconciliation efforts have been overshadowed by 
triumphalism and patriotism. The government has simultaneously portrayed itself as the savior of 
the Tamil people and Sri Lanka as a multi ethnic country. It seems that reconciliation is 
conditioned on the recognition of the Sri Lankan government as the victor and the Sinhalese 
armed forces as heroes. Correspondingly, areas that were isolated during the war have been made 
accessible, allowing for increased inter-ethnic interaction. There has been massive flow of 
Sinhalese tourists and pilgrims to the Tamil cultural capital Jaffna. This could potentially enable 
dialogue and reconciliation but local Tamil population has expressed concerns that the Sinhalese 
visitors do not show respect to local religious customs (Perera, 2010a in Höglund and Orjuela, 
2013, p.31). Thus, justice and reconciliation seems largely absent from Sri Lanka„s post war 
policies. 
 
 
4.4. Denial of multi ethnicity 
 
 
 
Ethnic issues in Sri Lanka have been one of the major causes to be addressed for a sustainable 
peace, which is also a key component of conflict prevention. With this regard when we see the 
post war Sri Lanka we can see the denial of ethnic existence of minority groups. For instance on 
May 19
th
 2009 former president Mahinda Rajapaksa„s speech presents the general landscape of 
politics in the country: 
 
 
“We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary three years ago. No longer 
are the[re] Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any other minorities. There are only 
two peoples in this country. One is the peoples who love this country. The other 
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comprises  the  small  groups  that  have  no  love  for  the  land  of  their  birth” 
 
(Wickramasinghe, 2009, p.2) 
 
 
 
According to Wickramasinghe, the prototype of this new patriotism which is, to her, not similar 
to the post national or constitutional patriotism that has been theorized as an alternative form of 
loyalty, compatible with universal values but distinct from and superior to nationalism. It has 
little in common even with a civic patriotism that recognizes the public sphere cannot be neutral. 
(Wickramasinghe, 2009, p.3) In contrast, the new patriotism of Rajapaksa merges nation and 
state and promotes a love of country based on Vramsa literature„s history and foundation myth of 
the Sinhala people in which the all other minority groups are merely present as shadows rather 
than as constitutive elements of a common political culture (ibid). Wickramasinghe defines this 
as blind patriotism which is a continuation to flag Buddhist nationhood. Moreover, it implies that 
political parties of the left or right have no role to play as the true path and best interests of all 
people are being persuade by the ruling party. To her in order to share the patriotism, there 
should be an effort to ensure that across communities, cultural symbols, religious ethnic of the 
majority and minorities recedes much as possible from the state apparatus, at least until wounds 
are healed.(Wickramasinghe, 2009, pp.3-9) 
 
 
The interview operated on the Tamils and Muslims in north and east by Minority Rights Group 
reveals that there are two major policies of political leadership that are of serious concern, which 
could be detrimental to minorities and unfavorable to them. The government policy and practices 
are evident to the intention of establishing a Sinhala Buddhist hegemonic state. The statement 
also proved by the interview of the representatives of minority political parties, civil society and 
religious groups. (MRG, 2011, p.7) 
 
 
There are strong believes in the government that the main cause of the conflict is the lack of 
development and everything will come through development. Minority representatives 
interviewed by Minority Rights Group express that the acknowledgement of legitimate minority 
grievances that are the root causes of conflict; the promotion and protection of minority rights 
and freedoms; a serious and credible effort towards justice, accountability and reconciliation; and 
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a genuine attempt to present a political solution that would satisfy minorities, are appear to be 
missing from the state agenda (MRG, 2011, p.7). 
 
 
In contrast, rather than addressing the issues government took the policy of „Sinhalization‟ 
through influx of Sinhalese as visitors to the north and the proliferation of Sinhala Buddhist 
religious symbols in traditionally minority areas. Recently Sinhalese people, who didn„t have 
access to the north during the conflict; have been visiting to the Buddhist religious sites and 
military monuments in the north. At the end of the conflict, the military destroyed all the LTTE 
monuments. On the other hand, massive monuments dedicated to the military victory were 
erected on the main road. There are also stopping points where the military scored a major 
victory against the Tigers or where the LTTE perpetrated a civilian attack. However, there is no 
mention of attacks, killings or human rights violations by the military.(MRG, 2011, p.13) The 
proliferation of Buddhist religious symbols (Buddha and Buddhist shrines) in the areas generates 
concern among Muslims and Tamils in the north and eastern part. This tendency becomes so 
common that a Buddhist shrine is erected where ever a Bo tree is found. Moreover, MRG reveals 
that sometimes these trees are planted by state agents and shrines are built subsequently. There 
are also reports of cases where areas in eastern Sri Lanka have been demarcated as Buddhist 
religious sites because Buddhist artefacts have been found there. However, it is evident in 
Trincomalee that these artefacts were planted in the area. As the interviewees say people came at 
night, on motorcycles, with sacks full of items which they planted in the area, sometimes with 
the help of state officials and police. (MRG, 2011, p.14) 
 
 
Another concern is the replacement of Tamil place names with Sinhalese names, which occurs 
mainly after linking a area to a Buddhist religious event and turn into a site of pilgrimage. For 
instances, Thiruvadinilai in Jaffna, has now been renamed Jambukolapatune. Buddhists in Sri 
 
Lanka believe that this is where Prince Ashoka„s daughter, the first female Buddhist missionary, 
first set foot in Sri Lanka. A shrine was built in 2005 and a temple in 2009, which was opened by 
the President„s wife, Shiranthi Rajapaksa, and her son, Namal Rajapaksa, in 2010. Another 
recent name change in Jaffna is Kathirimalai to Kadurugaoda. (MRG, 2011, p.14) According to 
MRG assessment the state does not prevent Tamils and Muslims from practicing their religion 
and culture; yet the activities described above challenge international human and minority rights 
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guarantees relating to the promotion and protection of minority cultural and religious rights, 
particularly in minority dominated areas. (MRG, 2011, p.14) 
 
 
4.5. Reconstruction and development 
 
 
While some of the important conditions of conflict prevention literature are largely absent in Sri 
 
Lanka„s post war policies, on the contrary the reconstruction and economic development has 
been followed by the government as the main path towards sustainable peace. The conflict 
prevention literature emphasizes on economic stability and swift rebuilding of war-torn areas for 
successful prevention for instances, according to Collier and Hoeffler (2000, p.5) economic 
stability is a key concern for conflict prevention because, economic instability can exacerbate 
grievances that motivate renewed violence, as well as leaving groups of the population 
unemployed and hence easily mobilized. (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.31) 
 
 
In the context of Sri Lanka the economic development was unevenly distributed geographically, 
the main economic prosperity found in the west of the country, mainly around the capital and the 
north and east of the island falling behind due to lack of investments and the destruction caused 
by the war (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.32). Therefore, the end of the war has provided an 
opportunity for large development and reconstruction initiatives in these areas, as well as 
elsewhere. 
 
 
Development  in the  north  and  east  is  taking  place  under  two  main  schemes:  in  the  north 
 
„VadakkinVasantham‟ (NorthernSpring), in the east „NagenahiraUdanaya‟ (EasternAwakening) 
(MRG, 2011, p, 14). With the help of foreign donors the government has focused on a number of 
large-scale infrastructure projects. Two ports are under construction (in the south and the east), a 
new airport is planned (in the south), and several coal, wind and hydro-power plants are being 
built or are in the planning stages, along with roads, a railway and a range of urban development 
projects (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p,14). Most of the Tamils and Muslims interviewed for 
MRG report in the north and east are impressed by the development and see potential benefits for 
themselves and their communities. However, some individuals and activists are concerned about 
some issues for example, the lack of consultation and participation of local people in the 
projects, the undermining of local indigenous knowledge and culture, and the politicization and 
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ethnicization of the process (MRG, 2011, p, 14). For example, during road-building, several 
Palmyra trees have been cut down. These trees are integral to the northern Tamil culture and 
every part of the tree is used by local women for their daily activities and livelihood. In 
comparison of building highways nothing is being done to develop the small roads in the 
villages, little has done to develop village market while plans are under way to create 
commercial hubs says the activist interviewed (MRG, 2011, p, 14). Hence, the main question is 
about the priorities and who will be the actual beneficiaries rather than challenging the 
development project. 
 
 
Moreover, Development and reconstruction are planned and carried out by the central 
government; the Vadakkin Vasantham programme was announced by former President 
Rajapaksa and plans were drafted by his brother and senior adviser Basil Rajapaksa. 
Interviewees in the north and east expressed concerns that these plans were prepared without 
consulting local-level officials or people living in these areas. Politicization and militarization of 
the development project is another matter of concern. In 2009 the President appointed a task 
force on northern development where only one Tamil and one Muslim out of 19 members 
implementing development in an area where nearly 100 per cent of the population are from 
minority groups. Large-scale development projects are planed and implemented under the 
purview of Basil Rajapaksa, who is also the Minister for Economic Development, and the Urban 
Development Authority (UDA). In 2010 reshuffling the government departments and ministries 
the UDA was brought under the defense ministry and the defense secretary is another of the 
president„s brothers, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. (MRG, 2011, p, 15) Though, some Tamil and 
Muslim political leaders are playing active role nevertheless, mostly of them are publicly 
element of the projects and not in the planning and implementation. MRG reveals that many 
activists assume the development as an infringement of their right to self-determination and to 
develop their own areas. According to the UNDM Article 5 the right to participation in 
development is an integral aspect of minority rights (MRG, 2011, p, 15). All these issues raise 
concern that the reconstruction projects are carried out without sensitivity to potential conflicts 
as well as development and security interventions in the north and east of Sri Lanka have paved 
the way for an inflow of Sinhalese settlers to traditionally Tamil areas (cf. International Crisis 
Group, 2009; Fonseka & Rahim, 2010, pp. 31ff.) Moreover, in some cases the displacement of  
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Tamils during the war has taken as advantage for large-scale development investments for 
instances, the coal power plant in Trincomalee district. According to Höglund and Orjuela an 
equipment of conflict prevention area reconstruction and development got the highest effort from 
Sri Lankan government. However, there are lots of examples of creating new conflicts and 
exacerbating the grievances of minority groups through development initiatives. Thus, 
International actors can help boost economic growth that may have a conflict-preventing effect, 
but at the same time they risk supporting conflict-fuelling development initiatives. (Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2011, pp. 32-33) 
 
 
4.6. Resettlement and living conditions 
 
 
 
Predominantly minority populated area the north and east were affected throughout the conflict. 
The Eastern Province consists of the administrative districts of Ampara, Batticaloa and 
Trincomalee. Here about one-third of the populations are Sinhalese and the majorities are Tamils 
and Muslims. On the other hand, the Northern Province consists of the electoral districts of 
Jaffna (administrative district of Jaffna and Mannar) and the Vanni (this includes Kilinochchi, 
Mulaitivu and Vavuniya districts). Here just over 1 per cent of the population is Sinhala. (MRG, 
2011, p.8) 
 
 
Sri Lanka faced a serious humanitarian crisis after the war. In Vanni 284,400 people were 
displaced from their homes and in temporary accommodation at the end of May 2009. Most of 
them were in the notorious Menik Farm camp, living in squalid conditions and facing 
government imposed internment. In November 2009 after strong national and international 
pressure the government opened up the camps, granting limited freedom of movement and 
realizing some people to join their families or to move to other camps in Vavuniya and Jaffna. 
The government began to return and resettle families in the Vavuniya, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, 
Mannar and Mulaitivu districts in late 2009. According to the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) by September 2010, 230,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) had been sent from the camps, too their camps, to rejoin their families or to their 
homes. The government and international agencies claim that nearly 90 per cent of people have 
been resettled. 
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However, MRG argues that this number may reflect the number of people sent out of the camps 
but not mean they have been returned or resettled. (MRG, 2011, p.8) In September 2010, 25,050 
people remain in Menik Farm who are mostly either do not want to return to their homes because 
of the trauma the experienced, have no relatives to be resettled to, or have no access to their 
homes due to the de-mining process. Though, the government effort of resettling the displaced 
people got international attention as a positive step but the process far away to meet the 
international standard. For instances, according to UN Guiding Principles 28-30 on internal 
displacement, the state has the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions and 
provide means for IDPs to return safely and voluntarily as well as full participation of IDPs are 
required in planning and management of their return and resettlement. (MRG, 2011, p.8) 
 
 
According to MRG report the old IDPs are also lacking proper treatment and resettlement. Due 
to the creation of High Security Zones estimated 84,000 displaced and over 65,000 Muslims 
displaced in Puttalam as reported in July 2010. Including the remained Menik Farm IDPs, these 
entire groups situation is uncertain as they receive very little assistance and hardly any pressure 
is being put on the government to resettle them, as the attention of international donors has 
shifted to the resettlement process. They are excluded from the resettlement plans of the 
government. In addition the state authorities declare the IDP crisis as nearly resolved without 
considering the situation of old IDPs. (MRG, 2011, p.10) 
 
 
Along with the resettlement issue the poor living condition of these people is another matter of 
concern. The returnees are provided with the bare minimum financial and material support. 
Many found their properties inaccessible due to destruction, de-mining, secondary occupation or 
occupation by the military. Those being resettled were promised 25,000 Sri Lankan rupees 
(SLR); 5000 in cash and the rest to be deposited in their bank accounts. However, some returnees 
stated that they did not receive this money. They were also given some plastic sheets, sticks to 
hold up plastic covers as roofs and a few household items. One interviewee said: the plastic 
sheets are mainly to put on the floor but they are using this as roofs as they don„t have roof. 
 
Every house has been damaged or demolished due to war and the government returned people to 
these areas without providing the basic shelter and sanitary facilities. (MRG, 2011, p.8), 
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Internally Displaced People who have been allowed to resettle in their original in the North and 
East areas of Valikamam have found that their houses were in dilapidated condition with the 
doors windows and roofs removed by vandals in areas marked for resettlement by the 
Government in the latter part of March 2015.Ceylon Today quotes one internally displaced 
person in the North-East as saying, 
 
 
“We lived as IDPs for the past 27 years in welfare centres and in the houses of our 
relatives and friends. Now we have returned to our own lands without any support to 
start a new life. All our immovable assets are either damaged or have been stolen.” 
 
(Ceylon Today, April 17, 2015) 
 
 
 
There are serious issues of transparency regarding the reconstruction plans, and returnees‟ access 
the international agencies and NGOs supporting the process. (MRG, 2011, p.8) 
 
 
Families resettled have very limited income and livelihood support. Most of the people in these 
areas were either farmers or fishermen, but they are unable to return to cultivation or to access 
the sea front in most areas for security reasons and because of landmines, and sometimes of poor 
condition of boats and nets. Because of the lack of income-generating opportunities poverty 
levels are high. Some people grow vegetables in their gardens and sell them, others try to open 
small shops but these are dwarfed by the big shops on the main roads that are run by the army. 
Due to lack of infrastructure skilled workers find it difficult to find employment. Though, there 
are development projects but workers are brought in from other part of the country. Schools, 
hospitals, markets, and shops have not been properly built and are not fully operational. In the 
main towns schools and hospitals are being built, but adults and children who live in the villages 
have to walk miles to access them. In many cases classes are conducted under the trees. (MRG, 
2011, p.9) 
 
 
Families headed by a single woman facing more difficulties. According to recent study there are 
89,000 war widows in the entire north and east and around 20,000 female-headed households in 
Jaffna alone. Most of these women have little or no employment opportunities. They are also 
exposed to sexual abuse and harassment in resettled areas.  
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There are also reports of rape: one case in the Visvamadu area (one of the resettlement zones), on 
6 June 2010, a group of men reportedly went to the houses of two women – a 28 year-old mother 
of two and a 38 year-old mother of five – and raped them. In response to the complaint of those 
women six soldiers were arrested by the police. Activists and women interviewed for MRG 
report mentioned cases of women being coerced into sexual activity, or in some situations doing 
so voluntarily in return for favors from military personnel or to ensure their protection. Many 
families are afraid to report cases because the perpetrators remain in such close proximity to the 
victim. With the large military presence and power imbalance between soldiers and civilians, 
families fear that if they complain on such issues, other family members could be arrested, 
detained or disappeared. (MRG, 2011, pp.9-10) 
 
 
Moreover, documents such as land titles, birth, marriage and death certificates are basic 
necessities and particularly important in the context of post-war reconstruction and development. 
For instance, people need land titles to make a claim for permanent homes or toilets. The 
marriage certificate and death certificates are important factors for women. For the large number 
of female-headed households, death certificates proving that their husbands have died are 
essential to be able to claim compensation, to claim benefits, in some cases to put children into 
school, and to remarry. Although, the government has begun a process to expedite the granting 
of death certificates, however, activists interviewed for MRG report expressed fears that the fact 
that the authorities continue to dispute the numbers of those killed in the last stages of fighting 
may limit the number of death certificates they are willing to issue. (MRG, 2011, p.11) 
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4.7. The actors of conflict prevention and efforts 
 
 
 
Effective conflict prevention relies on the coordination of a range of actors and their 
complementary activities, and the timing and sequencing of their involvement. Traditional actors 
in short-term approaches to conflict prevention are governments and international organizations 
whose diplomatic channels can make an impact on the escalation of conflict. On the other hand 
track-two actors, such as NGOs, civil society, universities, epistemic communities, churches, or 
schools are more suitable to the long-term activities of peace stabilization. Though, the track-two 
actors have only limited capacities and mandates to create the political, economic, and social 
stability and justice that are necessary to ensure lasting peace and mitigate the need for short-
term prevention. However, they can play invaluable role at the micro-level of conflict prevention 
through educating about intergroup conflicts and early mediating of social disputes as well as 
early warning of impending conflicts. (Schnabel and Carment, 2004, pp.7-8) 
 
 
In the context of Sri Lanka the actors are divided into three parts, government action; secondly, 
nation-state actors, and thirdly, non-state actors and organizations. 
 
 
4.7.1. Sri Lankan Government’s action 
 
 
 
As a primary authority over the citizen the government of Sri Lanka has the prime responsibility 
to deal with the post-war issues. Having discussed the preventive measures it seems that the 
government put all its efforts mostly on development sector and other components to establish 
sustainable peace remain insignificant. According to Dr N. Manoharan, Senior Fellow, 
Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi after the termination of war former President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa outlined „Four-Ds‟ strategy – Demilitarization, Development, 
Democratization, and Devolution. On the order of transformation, Rajapaksa justified that 
„demilitarization‟ lays the foundation for peace and development; without „development‟ one 
cannot have democracy; „democracy‟ is important to know the minds of the people; and then 
comes „devolution‟ (cited in 2013). 
 
 
 
84 
The „demilitarization‟ strategy of the government was mainly aimed at preventing any regroup of 
the LTTE in any form in future. In response to international pressure the „National Action Plan 
for the Reintegration of Ex-combatants‟ has been taken by the government. The framework of 
reintegration covered five aspects: disarmament and demobilization, rehabilitation, reinsertion, 
social reintegration, and economic reintegration. Separate „welfare centers‟ for each category 
were set up in the districts of Jaffna, Batticaloa and Vavuniya to rehabilitate. Around 556 child 
combatants – were provided with catch-up education classes and allowed family visits and 
reunion. Nevertheless, free access to specialized independent international agencies like Save the 
Child, UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could have made the 
rehabilitation more successful. In the initial stages, there were human rights abuses in the 
rehabilitation process, but mellowed down later. (Manoharan, 2013) Some former LTTE 
heavyweights have started working with the Sri Lankan military intelligence neutralizing the 
internal and external networks of the LTTE. 
 
 
Development has been the most important factor emphasized by the government. As we 
discussed earlier, the government have undertaken massive reconstruction and resettlement 
programme under the „Presidential Task Force for Development of the Northern Province‟ the 
process of development in the north has been proceeding on some logic like demining of areas 
meant for resettlement and reconstruction, building up of basic infrastructure like houses, roads, 
schools, energy grid, and telecommunications. Providing livelihood opportunities to all the 
resettled IDPs is yet another mammoth task before the government. In November 2013 the 
ministry of resettlement took a draft „Framework for Resettlement Policy‟. The aim of this policy 
is to address the administrative, logistical, advisory, humanitarian and other forms of needs of 
internally displaced persons, returnee refugees of legitimate Sri Lankan origin and resettled 
communities. The policy has been prepared taking into account the very special nature of the 
circumstances within which the displacements occurred and the exact nature of support and 
assistance apparently required by the persons concerned to encounter the twin challenges of 
resettling and reintegrating with the society and the economy while reinvigorating their already 
diminished social and economic potential. It also identifies rights, protection and facilities 
needed by IDPs and returnee refugees for resettlement and reintegration. (Ministry of 
resettlement, 2013) It emphasizes on the resettlement of refugees, land and property rights, 
access to schooling and health care, gender equality and children rights, training, and psycho- 
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social assistance. It recognized the private property rights and the refugees should be resettled 
and reintegrated in their places of origin (Ministry of resettlement, 2013, pp.3-6). For housing 
each family will be provided with Rs. 50,000 for temporary shelter, on long term basis Rs. 
325,000 for reconstruction, and 100,000 to renovate houses. As well as, assistance will be 
provided for sanitary system.  
In order to restoration of livelihood, agricultural incentives, fishing industry, animal husbandry 
and training are promised in the policy (Ministry of resettlement, 2013, pp.5-6; LLRC, 2011, p, 
211). In addition, the policy recognizes the IDPs and refugees rights for instances: freedom of 
expression, protection from abuse, access to all rights and benefits enjoyed by other citizens in 
the country, and to be heard in decisions making process relating to their rights and welfare 
(Ministry of resettlement, 2013, p.9). The government finds lack of sufficient resources as the 
major challenge confronting its reconstruction plans. 
 
 
According to Dr N. Manoharan, „Democratization strategy in the post-conflict phase was 
justified by former President Rajapaksa to give „voice to the people‟. Manoharan points that 
Rajapaksa„s policy of dissolving the parliament and announcing election for April 2010, just 
after being re-elected as executive president in January 2010, helped him to win the election. In 
addition, within months after the war, the government conducted elections to local bodies of 
Jaffna and Vavuniya. This was the first elections held in the Tamil-dominated areas after the 
formal end of ethnic war in the island. Tamil National Alliance won the election. This is marked 
significant as the Tamils still nature grievances and look forward to a responsible leadership. 
Moreover, Rajapaksadid appoint an „All Party Representative Committee‟ (APRC) in 2006 to 
fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations as well as provide a comprehensive 
approach to the resolution of the national question. However, instead of exploring „creative 
options‟ the APRC, in its interim report submitted in January 2008, advised the President to 
implement the 13
th
 amendment to the Constitution. 
 
 
Regarding reconciliation, Rajapaksa appointed an eight-member commission on „Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation‟ (LLRC) in May 2010. LLRC submitted its report in December 2011. It tried 
to do a balancing act containing both positive and negative aspects. On positives it talked about 
the need for demilitarization, investigation of disappearances, apart from acknowledging 
existence of ethnic grievances; surprisingly, it supported devolution of powers to minorities,  
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although did not spell them out. At the same time, it did not fix accountability for human rights 
abuses during the final stages of War, for the collateral damage the report reasoned out as a result 
of LTTE action and military reaction. Talks with TNA were a good move, but they did not take 
things any further. In the same vein, the Sri Lankan government must count-in the Opposition„s 
contribution in the nation-building. Without bi-partisan consensus, any political settlement to the 
ethnic question would be unsustainable. 
 
 
President Sirisena's victory over Mahinda Rajapaksa in January 2015 was met with both 
optimism and skepticism across the world. Sirisena made 25 promises to be enacted in the first 
100 days of his office, and one of these was to introduce the right to information bill, which will 
free up access to official information, and the government has pledged to protect the freedom of 
the press. Moreover, the president promised to replace the military governors in the Tamil-
dominated northern and eastern provinces with civilian governments. The Sri Lankan military 
has a large presence in these Tamil areas - estimates from 2013 suggested there was one soldier 
for every five civilians in the mainland northern area of Sri Lanka. (Channel 4, 10 March, 2015) 
According to Fred Carver of the London-based Sri Lanka „Campaign for Peace and Justice‟ the 
day-to-day reality in for the Tamils is similar as it was before, and the problem is that the 
leadership has changed but the structure and the general attitude in the army and the police and 
security state is very much still in force. (Channel 4, 10 March, 2015) Finally, the government 
should take suitable reconciliation mechanism to construct bridges among all the communities in 
the island. 
 
 
4.7.2. External Nation-State actors 
 
 
 
Since 1980s external actors gradually become connected with Sri Lankan conflict. Among the 
nation-states India, Pakistan, China, USA, and Norway are crucial actors. 
 
 
As the close neighbor India formulated much of its foreign policy and peace initiatives in Sri 
Lanka based on its own domestic issues and national interests. India preferred a solution to the 
issue within the framework of constitutional arrangements which preserves Sri Lanka„s territorial 
integrity.  
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India has been feared about that a successful liberation movement in Sri Lanka could inspire 
radical nationalistic groups in Tamil Nadu and lead to separation or instability within its own 
boundaries. According to International Crisis Group Report (2011, p.5) from Indira Gandhi‟s 
decision to arm Tamil militants in the early 1980s and Rajiv Gandhi„s dispatching of the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord, to India‟s support for Sri 
Lanka‟s final military campaign against the Tamil Tigers in 2008-2009, the violent conflict 
between Tamil nationalist militant sand the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan state has always 
been intertwined with policies and attitudes in New Delhi and in the southern state of Tamil 
Nadu. After May 2009 India has been pursuing an ambitious package of initiatives in Sri Lanka, 
with post-war financial assistance of more than $1.5 billion. It includes: 
 
 
• Firstly, humanitarian assistance for the resettlement of the roughly 300,000 Tamils in the 
Northern Province and construction of 50,000 new houses.  
 
• Secondly, loans for infrastructure development.  
 
• Thirdly, encouraging the government and the main Tamil political formation, the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA), to engage in talks to resolve the ethnic conflict through 
devolution of power to the north and east, other forms of power-sharing and inclusion of 
minority representatives in decision-making.  
 
• Finally, increased trade and economic integration between India and Sri Lanka, including 
through the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Policy Agreement (CEPA), the re-
establishment of a ferry service between southern India and north-west Sri Lanka, and the 
integration of the Indian and Sri Lankan electrical power grids. (International Crisis Group 
Report, 2011, p.8)  
 
 
Pakistan has deep military and political ties with Sri Lanka which is appearing to be growing 
closer. Pakistan‟s involvement in Sri Lanka can be understood by its relation with India. As a 
rival of India, Pakistan most likely became involved with Sri Lankan conflict as a means to 
upsetting India and asserting its own power over the region. Pakistan has long been an outspoken 
supporter of the Sri Lankan state‟s campaign against the LTTE, as well as one of the island‟s 
largest suppliers of military hardware in recent years. Pakistan had also stationed roughly a 
dozen military personnel in Sri Lanka over the past decade, who extended technical assistance  
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and training for the SLAF (Sri Lankan Air Force) during its air campaign against the LTTE. In 
November 2010, the then Pakistani President Zardari and Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa agreed 
in Colombo to take the relationship to „new heights‟. The two leaders reportedly agreed to 
enhance intelligence-sharing on terrorism and President Zardari reportedly offered to train Sri 
Lankan police and other security officials in counterterrorism, as well as extended $200 million 
in soft credit to facilitate trade. However, Pakistan‟s economy is weak and the government has 
very few resources to invest in Sri Lanka„s postwar reconstruction (International Crisis Group 
Report, 2011, pp.15-17) 
 
 
Moreover, Sri Lanka‟s relation with Pakistan is intertwined with the relation of China. There are 
arguments that China can use Pakistan as force-multiplier in South and Central Asia. India‟s 
unwillingness to provide offensive weapons to Sri Lanka allowed China to fill the gap. For long 
time China has been largest arms supplier to Sri Lanka but the support spiked to roughly 1billion 
dollar in 2008. Chinese weapons, such as F-7 fighter jets as well as ammunition and radars, were 
vital. Political support from China, as well from other countries, prevented any meaningful 
discussions of the war in the Security Council despite the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the 
 
Vanni. Beijing„s backing allowed the Sri Lankan government to win the war while 
circumventing India, ignoring the West and blatantly violating the Geneva Conventions. After 
the war, China strongly opposed the UN Secretary-General„s establishment of a panel of experts 
on accountability for alleged war crimes, pointing out that the Sri Lankan government had 
already set up its own commission in May 2010. Moreover, since the end of the war 
development assistance has exploded with an infusion of donation, grants, investments and 
loans. For instances, in 2009 China promised 1.2 billion dollar aid donation. According to the 
country„s 
 
Board of Investment, China also is the biggest investor. However, most of these dealings with 
China appear to have little transparency. Most of the large developments assisted by China took 
place in the southern part. In the Tamil-majority area the investment spilled to the area 
geographically closer to India. Thus, Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka seems more to 
strengthen regional influence rather than conflict prevention. (International Crisis Group Report, 
2011, p.18) 
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United States and Norway are two important nation-states outside the region, played significant 
role in Sri Lankan conflict. Sri Lanka got U.S. attention since late 2001; apparently in 2003 the 
conflict reached a point where U.S. involvement proves to be vital, argued Armitage. From 
2005-2009 the U.S. financing for arms purchase ranges from half to one million annually. In 
March 2008, the U.S. donated $220,000 worth of anti-terrorism equipment to the Sri Lankan 
Police as well as a huge amount also provided as aid money for development, (CPCS, p.14). In 
2009, the United States was the leading donor of food and humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka, 
with a total USAID budget of $43.12 million. More than 280,000 IDPs have been assisted by 
food rations, water and sanitation facilities, temporary shelters, emergency medical treatment, 
and mobility aids for the disabled (U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relation, 2009). The U.S. 
administration has consistently called for an end to human rights abuses, protection and rapid 
resettlement of IDPs, and genuine efforts towards reconciliation in part through statements from 
president Obama. The State Department, under the leadership of its new U.S. Ambassador to Sri 
Lanka, Patricia Butenis, has demanded progress from the Government on eight benchmarks 
including improved conditions in the camps, return of IDPs, political progress, and de-mining. 
The Treasury Department abstained on the $2.6 billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka this summer 
because of humanitarian concerns. Moreover, at congress„s behest, the U.S. government 
continuous to suspend military aid to Sri Lanka and issued a report on incidents during the war 
that may have constituted violations of international humanitarian law. U.S. evaluated its relation 
with Sri Lanka and recommended the US administration to reflect on new political and economic 
realities. (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2009) 
 
 
As a neutral, nonthreatening and acceptable country Norway was invited by the Sri Lankan 
government to facilitate the peace process between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE in 
1999. Since 1997 Norway has been playing a role as peace process facilitator and 2002 ceasefire 
agreement has been considered as a great achievement of this effort (NORAD, 2011, p.3). The 
history of cooperation between Norway and Sri Lanka dates back to 1967 when Norway first 
started supporting development projects. During the conflict Norway took several initiatives of 
peace process which was built around heavy international engagement, including international 
security guarantees, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Norwegian facilitation of Track 
One negotiations, the co-chair system (the EU,US, Japan, and Norway), international funding,  
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support for Track Two initiatives, and the donor reconstruction package. Norway played a 
critical part in keeping these various groups working together in order for a cohesive move 
towards peace processes (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, p.16).  
 
However, the Norwegian role have been criticized by the LTTE as the minority groups felt 
marginalized within the process with the soft stand of international actors regarding the human 
rights violation and focusing only on conflict management undermined its role as a credible 
mediator. In the last phase of the war Norway worked to limit the suffering of the civilians and 
encouraged the parties to comply with the international law. After the end of the war the priority 
areas of Norway in Sri Lanka are: peace and reconciliation, good governance, women and gender 
equality and reconstruction. AS a result of Norway„s effort there were dialogue meetings 
between 571 religious leaders in 12 districts and training of 673 female leaders in political 
participation,7277 village leaders were educated in civil rights and 400 former LTTE soldiers 
have gained assistance for reintegrating in the society after release from the government 
rehabilitation center. 13 organizations have been supported by Norway with an emphasis on 
peace building, democracy, human rights and good governance. Norway's assistance for 
environmental initiatives amounted to 5.9 million NOK in 2012, while in economic development 
and vocational training sector aid amounted to 7.4 million NOK. In the same year it started a 
technical cooperation with Sri Lanka in the fisheries sector. In addition, Norway also entered a 
technical collaboration in 2012 via the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute for prevention of 
natural disasters as a result of climate change. Landmine clearing financed by Norway in 2012 
has enabled 6000 families to return to their homes (NORAD, 2013). Moreover, it is also working 
in collaboration with organizations like „Transparency International‟, Sri Lanka Press Institute 
for supporting good governance and the assistance in this sector amounted to 2.6 million in 2012 
(NORAD, 2013). Through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and five women's 
organizations Norway provided three million NOK in 2012 for women's rights. (NORAD, 2013) 
 
 
Thus, external nation-state actors have been playing a great role in post-war preventive 
peacebuilding. Actors out of the region mostly working in the development, reconciliation and 
justice sector however, activities of the regional states are mostly determined by the geopolitical 
interest in the region.  
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4.7.3. Non-state actors and organizations 
 
 
 
NGOs and civil societies are very important actors in conflict prevention. A large number of 
NGOs and civil societies are working in Sri Lanka within this process. In the field of 
reconciliation NGOs like „Centre for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation‟ (CPBR) Sri Lanka, 
„Centre for Peace and Reconciliation‟ (CPR) are working. CPBR and Centre for Human Rights 
and Research (CHRR) aims to bridge divisions in Sri Lanka by creating networked 
peacebuilding groups in diverse areas of the country, simultaneously empowering communities  
to address their own needs and raising awareness of the similarity of such needs across the 
country„s ethnic boundaries. CPR works with victims of the war such as school children, 
teachers, war widows, orphans and people who have been economically marginalized due to war. 
Their main purpose is to create a safe community for all ethnicities to live in harmony and peace.  
CPR has conducted training for more than 1,000 students from 55 schools, 25 school teachers, 
and 30 school principals and deputy principals, in Thenmaratchi and Valikamam. (Insight on 
Conflict, 2014) 
 
The National Peace Council„s (NPC) main focus area is peace education. It has created a 
network of committed activists throughout Sri Lanka. The Child Rehabilitation Centre (CRC) 
provides assistance to women and children affected by war. Although its main focus is on 
women and children„s rights, the organization provides general support to communities that were 
affected by war and it works to improve the life standards of the population, facilitate their 
recovery from trauma and engage them in the reconciliation process. Non-Violent Direct Action 
Group (NVDAG) also works to enhance the quality of life of war-affected children, young 
people and women by encouraging them to participate in social change, community development 
and rehabilitation activities (Insight on Conflict, 2014) 
 
 
The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) is an association of agencies working in, and 
supporting work in, Sri Lanka for peacebuilding and humanitarian work.  
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The Centre for Performing Arts centre focuses on the performing arts as a method for conflict 
resolution, healing and promoting co-existence and mutual cooperation between people from 
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. (Insight on Conflict, 2014) 
 
 
Rural Development Foundation (RDF) aims to improve the social and economic situation of 
people in underdeveloped areas of rural Sri Lanka. Moreover, it also aims at reducing sexual and 
gender-based violence committed in the IDP welfare centers, and to provide assistance to those 
affected by sexual and gender-based violence. (Insight on Conflict, 2014)  
 
Along with these NGOs there are some other NGOs which are working in different sectors of 
preventive peacebuilding. 
 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) generously funded „Social Networking and Psychosocial 
Reconstruction in the North‟. The program aimed to focus on training project, exposure visits, 
use of drama for healing, and monthly mental health clinic. Though, it was beyond the scope of a 
research institution however, it is trying to provide basic counseling and social networking with 
experienced professionals from the social sciences and medicine. (Herath, 2012, p.2) 
 
Therefore, a wide range of conflict prevention efforts have been taken by varied actors, which 
ranges from infrastructure development, resettlement, and economic development to 
reconciliation, justice, and different kind of social healing programs. Accordingly, it„s time to 
assess the efforts, how successful are those to establish a sustainable positive peace. Are they 
strong enough to prevent the relapse the conflict? Based on the theoretical analysis and the 
efforts taken by different actors, the next part of the thesis will present a general analytical 
conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93
 Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Analysis of various preventive actions by different actors in post war Sri Lanka in the previous 
chapters enables to answer the question whether the measures are effective enough to establish 
sustainable and positive peace in the light of theoretical insight. The measures represent the 
national and international policy towards the situation; on the other hand the theoretical analysis 
provides the framework to assess those measures. Due to high degree of conceptual ambiguity it 
is very difficult to determine whether the conflict prevention action is successful or not. It largely 
depends on defining the issue. Talentino argues that success can be considered when it prevents 
or ends conflict in the short-term and undertake efforts to alter the underlying causes of violence 
(Talentino, in Carment and Schnabel, 2003, p.73). Generally, there are lots of determinants and 
factors to examine the success or failure. To some extent defining the success depends on the 
availability of comparable indicators and there are no precise indicators to determine the 
outcomes (Wallensteen and Möllar, 2004, p.7). It requires interpreting each case separately. 
Therefore, focusing on the relevant measures of conflict prevention theory is an important tool to 
explain the nature of post war Sri Lankan prevention efforts. 
 
 
The aim of conflict prevention is ending the violent conflict, preventing escalation and 
preventing reemergence of the ended conflict. Accordingly, it also includes the question of 
establishing positive and sustainable peace. As it was discussed earlier that the conflict 
prevention discourse and tools tend to assume a negotiated peace agreement where the conflict 
parties have an interest in solving conflicts rather than merely suppressing them„ (Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2013, p.4). Nonetheless, in Sri Lanka the power asymmetry between the winning and 
losing sides, coupled with the lack of power or interest of international actors to influence the 
country„s domestic affairs, have rendered conflict prevention a tool for continued domination 
and containment of conflicts (ibid). Analyzing these factors it can be demonstrated what type of 
prevention is in effect and the outcome. 
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Thus, this chapter is dealing with the characteristics of conflict prevention in Sri Lanka and 
examining its effectiveness to establish sustainable peace. 
 
 
 
 
The characteristics of conflict prevention in Sri Lanka can be identified, through a comparative 
study of the theory and case, as follows 
 
 
First of all, according to the assessment of the conflict prevention measures in the post war Sri 
Lanka, the situation can be defined as militarization instead of following the core requirements 
of conflict prevention paradigm: demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former 
combatants. This militarization ranges from increase of military expenditure, high military 
presence in the former war torn areas and establishment of military base camps, to replacement 
of civilian administrative positions by military personnel. It also includes settlement of army 
families in the Tamil populated north and east areas, military controlled development projects 
and economic activities for instances agriculture and farming, fishing and establishing shopping 
mall. Arrangement of any family program or gathering also requires military permission. Thus, 
militarization has been identified as a feature of post war Sri Lankan preventive peacebuilding, 
which oppose to the conflict prevention approach. 
 
 
Secondly, economic development and reconstruction has been recognized by the government as 
the main instrument to establish peace. There are a large number of infrastructure projects. Ports 
and airports, several coal, wind and hydro-power plants, roads, railway and urban development 
projects are being built or in the planning stages. The project highly appreciated however; there 
are concern about the politicization and ethnicization of the process. It is accused of 
undermining the indigenous knowledge and culture and lack of consultation and participation of 
local people. 
 
 
Resettlement of the displaced people in the war torn areas is another necessary feature of 
conflict prevention in the country. After the war due to strong national and international 
pressure the government opened up camps granting limited freedom of movement. Later there 
are resettlements of displaced people but that is not confirmed in their own old places. In some 
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cases people are living in the war torn roof less houses due to lack of financial and material 
support. In addition, there are transparency problem regarding the returnees and reconstruction 
process. Resettled peoples are also suffering of lack of income and livelihood support. 
 
 
Denial of multi ethnic existence and Sinhalization of the Tamil majority areas can be identified 
as another characteristic. The process includes proliferation of Sinhala Buddhist religious 
symbols, and massive monuments dedicated to the military victory, replacement of Tamil place 
names with Sinhalese name. The Sri Lankan government has destroyed all war cemeteries for 
Tamil cadres to build military camps on top of these cemeteries, with the claim to erase the 
memories of ethnic war. However, the government„s active promotion of war tourism 
reminding communities of ethnic divide, projecting the Sinhalese as the victors and the Tamils 
as vanquished. Sinhalese individuals and families are being settled in Tamil towns and villages 
with an intention of changing the demography of Tamil majority region. Moreover, coercive 
population control policies have been taken. On the other hand a new patriotism has been 
defined by the former president Rajapaksha which is also a denial of minority existence in the 
country. 
 
 
Regarding the political reform Sri Lanka„s situation has been defined by Hoglund and Orjuela 
as a series of missed opportunities. The end of the war has brought a great expectation among 
the people of having space for greater political debate and moderation among Tamils and 
government„s abandon of hard-line Sinhalese nationalism, for meaningful power devolution to 
the majority Tamil speaking northern and eastern province. However, in response to Tamil 
democratic moderate voice the government failed to make a positive change. Strong centralized 
state system denied the Tamil„s right to have meaningful control over land and economic 
policies, where they are majority. 
 
 
The question of justice has been met with a refusal of international inquire of war crime in Sri 
Lanka. The Sri Lankan regime is defying the calls for accountability for its conduct of the war in 
2009. Evidences collated and various reports produced by the UN panel of experts, 
documentaries by the UK Channel 4, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and 
International Crisis Group and many other human rights defenders have been pointing to the 
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need for an international independent investigation into the massacre of final stages of the war as 
well as the summary execution of those in captivity by the Sri Lankan military. According to 
Varadakumar of a London based research centre, the Tamil Information Centre, the new Sirisena 
government is in a gainful position to win over the victims of war (Tamil Guardian, 2015). The 
new government established a victim-centred transitional justice process that has the capacity 
and will to deliver credible transitional outcome. President Sirisena promised, in his election 
campaign, a domestic inquiry into any allegations of war crimes. However, these domestic 
measures are questionable regarding the transparency and international standard, on the other 
hand the international inquiry has not recognized by the government yet. 
 
 
Finally, socio-economic and environmental development is important component of Sri Lankan 
post war preventive efforts. Different international organizations, NGOs and countries are 
working for rural development, gender equality, building social trust, youth empowerment, 
creating work place, child rehabilitation, and environment protection. Moreover, there are also 
efforts to facilitate reconciliation and human rights protection. For healing the wound and 
creating awareness for peaceful coexistence there are centers for performing art as well as 
various training and counseling programs. All these are important elements of structural conflict 
prevention strategies, focusing on human security, conflict transformation and development cast 
a much broader net. 
 
 
 
 
Having discussed the characteristics of post war preventive measures a number of notions can 
be presented regarding their effectiveness of establishing sustainable peace. 
 
 
First of all, the core assumption of sustainable peace is not only the absence of physical violence 
from armed force and repression, which refers to negative peace, but also a process which will 
satisfy the peoples political need to access to decisions affecting their lives and provide 
mechanisms for addressing social grievances. Regarding this condition in Sri Lanka, the victor„s 
peace can be defined as a situation of negative peace where, there is huge militarization in the 
war affected areas, establishment of military camps including militarization of 
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administration, development project and economic activities. As it is discussed earlier that 
security sector reform and demilitarization of society are necessary for building a self-
sustainable peace but, Sri Lankan post war context poses significant challenges for such reforms 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2013, p, 26) 
 
 
Regarding the question of political access hardly any positive solution can be found in Sri 
Lanka. There were several initiatives and talks between the Tamil political parties and former 
president Rajapaksha but failed to reach any agreement on state power devolution. In addition, 
there is little light of resolving the issues of power devolution and demilitarization by the win of 
new president Sirisena which is evident from his statement in Colombo Gazette that 
 
 
“We have not signed any agreement with the Tamil National Alliance or Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress to devolve powers or divide the country” (Sirisena, Colombo Gazette, 
January 5, 2015) 
 
 
Moreover, he has no intention of withdrawing the army from the north if he wins the Presidential 
election, as national security will be his responsibility (Sirisena, Colombo Gazette, January 5, 
2015). 
 
 
Though there are international and NGO„s efforts for resolving the question of power sharing 
nevertheless, the willingness of the government is key factor to settle the issue. 
 
 
Another important factor for sustainable peace is addressing the root causes of the conflict, it is 
also important for preventing the relapse of conflict. Effective actions by the leaders and 
governments to ensure fundamental security, well-being, and justice for all citizens are the key to 
address the root causes of violence. All this lies to the structural approach to prevention which 
not only makes people better off but also it restrains the tendency to use violence to settle 
differences (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p.2). However, in this context of root causes there is 
still little genuine willingness to find a political solution to the underlying conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Fundamental principles of rule of law such as independence of the courts and the democratic 
environment have been further weakened over the entire country in 2012. 
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It is alarming that there are rising hate campaigns from the nationalistic Buddhist groups against 
the Tamils, Muslims and Christians (NORAD, 2013). Absence of egregious social division and 
material inequalities is crucial feature of sustainable peace. These also generates key component 
of grievances to construct conflict. However, in Sri Lanka we can see the inequalities and 
division subsistent. Though, in the post war situation the government took various measures of 
development and economic growth, bolstered by foreign investment, tourism and IMF loans 
however, the policymakers directed little attention to the inherent economic inequality that 
caused the ethnic conflict in the first place. 
 
 
The government should provide specific opportunities to the ethnic minorities and public 
communication strategy requires showing the minority communities about the benefits from the 
development activities. In addition, special attention should be paid to the most vulnerable 
groups for instances, unemployed youth pro-government Tamil militants, and victims of flood 
caused by monsoon rains. In the context of high economic development the sense of ethnic 
focused frustration among these particular minority groups can be build if they continue to feel 
marginalized and excluded from the country„s notable growth. 
 
 
Justice has been perceived as significant element of sustainable peace as it is shown earlier in the 
theoretical analysis part. There are arguments that the demand for justice could hinder the 
process to peace however, it is also evident that a minimum level of justice is emergent for 
peace. According to Ramsbotham negative peace turns into positive peace through justice. 
Restoration of justice facilitates to overcome the challenges of psychological trauma and creates 
space to deal with psycho-social healing. However, in Sri Lanka it can be seen that there is little 
effort to put a system of justice. The war crime issue in the final stage of war is crucial factor to 
revive the grievances of Tamils which requires transparent and fair justice and trial of the 
offenders. Although, there is internal tribunal but it is accused of lacking international standard. 
The government has been constantly refusing the international call for international 
investigation. Present Sri Lankan president Sirisena was the acting defense minister at the end of 
the conflict - and has echoed his predecessor's refusal to co-operate with the UN investigation.  
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Thus, the question of justice also remains unresolved as well as the standard of sustainable peace 
getting unreached. Moreover, to reduce the major grievances before they turn into problems, a 
process is needed with a synthesis of development, democracy, human rights and peace. This can 
be termed as good governance, which will allow people to determine their own priorities, 
safeguard and promote their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and provide 
apluralist environment, within which they can live with one another in peace, with the freedom 
to develop in all ways (Peck, 1998, p.17). In this context also Sri Lanka faces a deficiency. For 
instances, former president Rajapaksha„s new patriotism denies the ethnic existence of other 
minority groups. Little government response to power devolution, economic inequality, required 
military permission for gathering or social program, limitation on the freedom of expression; 
arrest of activists these entire poses question to the good governance process in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
In contrast, according to the policies of the resettlement ministry a comprehensive framework for 
the development of war affected population can be noticed. This includes strategies for 
resettlement, ensuring land and property rights for the returnees, access to school and health care, 
gender equality and children„s rights, training and psycho-social assistance. These seems well 
organized significant initiatives by the government to resolve the post war challenges however, 
the reality represents a different condition. On the other hand, other preventive peacebuilding 
efforts of NGOs and external powers are playing important role towards positive change 
nonetheless, they also requires a coordination of their activities. 
 
 
Therefore, Sri Lanka is representing a situation of negative peace, the cessation of direct violence 
coupled with repression, depression, exploitation and injustice where it is challenging to 
establish sustainable peace. Structural preventive measures are effective appliance not only to 
avoid violence or negative peace but rather aspiring to positive peace. However, it requires 
political will and coordination of instruments and policies. The absence of proper initiatives as 
well as the failure to address the root causes presents the potentiality of relapse of conflict. 
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